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*Public
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THE JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY
FOR PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

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Public Administration Review

THE JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

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IN THIS NUMBER

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Public Administration Review is intended to promote the exchange of ideas among public officials and students of administration. The various views of public policy and public administration expressed herein are the private opinions of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect the official views of the agencies for which they work or the opinions of the editors of this journal.

The Administration of Nationalized Industries in Britain

By WILLIAM A. ROBSON

*The London School of Economics
and Political Science*

AS A result of the return to power in 1945 of a Labour Government pledged to large measures of nationalization and physical planning, Britain is now confronting a series of new and difficult problems of public administration in these spheres of activity.

The field covered by the Government's nationalization policy extends broadly to the fuel, power, and transport industries and the Bank of England; the possible inclusion of part of the iron and steel industry hangs uncertainly in the balance. The construction and development of new towns is a novel enterprise which falls into a special category of its own. The transfer to national ownership of the hospitals relates to a social service rather than to an economic undertaking, and hence falls outside the scope of this article. It would need to be considered in relation to the new national health service of which it forms a part.

I

THE degree to which this program has secured legislative realization as of April, 1947, is as follows. Parliament has passed statutes nationalizing the Bank of England and the coal mining industry. The Civil Aviation Act, 1946, established three air transport corporations with exclusive rights to operate scheduled services within the United Kingdom or on international routes. It also enables the Minister of Civil Aviation to own and operate civil airfields, and all the airfields in Britain required for scheduled air services will be managed by his department. The New Towns Act, 1946, authorizes the Minister of Town and Country Planning to create new towns either on virgin land or on the sites of existing small

towns or villages; and he can set up development corporations for the purpose of executing the work.

In addition, three vast bills are at present before Parliament. The transport bill aims at nationalizing the railways, the inland waterways, and to some extent the trade harbors. The road haulage undertakings mainly engaged in the conveyance of goods for hire or reward over long distances (forty miles or upward) will also be taken over, but those operating local traffic or engaged in the private carriage of goods for manufacturers or traders will be unaffected. Road passenger transport services may be subject at a later date to development schemes involving public acquisition and management.

The electricity bill completes the movement toward the nationalization of electricity supply which was begun in 1926 when the Central Electricity Board was set up to construct and operate a nationwide system of interconnected generating stations known as the grid. The earlier legislation introduced a large measure of public ownership and control over the generation and distribution in bulk of electricity, but left the generating stations and the detailed distribution to consumers in the hands of the "authorised undertakers." Approximately two-thirds of these are town councils and one-third public utility companies. Now the whole mass of the undertakings will pass into national ownership and an integrated system of management.

The third bill is the town and country planning bill which entirely transforms the legal and administrative framework of town and country planning. Under this bill the develop-

ment rights over all land will be acquired by the public and vested in a body called the Central Land Board. This board will exercise, in conjunction with the central and local planning authorities, control over the development of land no matter for what purpose it may be required other than its present use.

These ambitious measures involve the establishment of new institutions of various kinds. One of the most amusing of Low's cartoons showed Mr. Dalton, as Chancellor of the Exchequer, leading a very dissolute-looking old lady of Threadneedle Street, accompanied by several children of dubious origin, to the altar and making an honest woman of her. This appeared on the occasion when the Bank of England became a public corporation. In civil aviation we have BOAC (set up in 1939) for the Commonwealth, Empire, and North Atlantic services, BEAC for the European services, and BSAAC for the routes to South America. The National Coal Board has already taken over the entire coal mining industry and its pennant flutters at every pithead. Three development corporations have been designated to build three towns in the London region, though the minister's procedure is being challenged in the courts. The transport bill provides that a British Transport Commission be appointed with general powers to carry goods and passengers by rail, road, and inland waterway and to provide port facilities. Below the Transport Commission are to be a series of executives. At the outset there will be a railway executive, a docks and inland waterways executive, a road transport executive, and a London passenger transport executive to replace the London Passenger Transport Board. Later there will be a hotels executive to manage the hotels owned by the railways. The electricity bill contemplates a new British Electricity Authority, to supersede the Central Electricity Board, together with a number of area electricity boards. The Electricity Commission will also disappear in due course.

All these bodies (with the possible exception of the transport executives) are public corporations, and so too is the Central Land Board. The gas industry is likely to be nationalized during the lifetime of the present Parliament; and a similar type of administrative agency will doubtless be used in that connection also.

We may therefore confidently assert that the public board or corporation has come to be recognized as the appropriate instrument for operating nationalized industries, public utilities, or services requiring management of an industrial or commercial character. I have discussed elsewhere¹ the advantages which this type of institution possesses over a government department in charge of a minister; and it is unnecessary to repeat the analysis. The public corporation has arrived in Britain. Its merits are recognized by all political parties despite differences of opinion among Labour, Liberal, and Conservative politicians as to the structure, powers, and degree of independence which such bodies should possess. There is, of course, substantial disagreement between the Government and the Opposition concerning nationalization policy, but that is a different matter. All parties have contributed to the evolution of the public corporation. It will probably occupy in the future as formative and central a position in the sphere of public enterprise as that which the joint stock company has occupied during the past hundred years in the sphere of private enterprise.

We are, then, experimenting with one of the most significant institutional innovations of our time. On the outcome of that experiment will depend in large measure the success or failure of the great effort at economic reform, increased efficiency, and physical improvement which Britain is now making. Great changes have also been made in the central government in order to bring its organization into line with modern needs. Of the six new permanent departments created since 1939, no fewer than four are concerned with the fields of activity in which these public corporations will be engaged: namely, the Ministry of Fuel and Power, the Ministry of Civil Aviation, the Ministry of Supply, and the Ministry of Town and Country Planning.

II

THE members of the boards of these corporations are in all cases appointed by the relevant minister, though the governor and the court of directors of the Bank of England are appointed formally by the King. There is no

¹ William A. Robson, ed., *Public Enterprise* (George Allen and Unwin, 1937).

repetition of the device of an intermediate body of "appointing trustees" used in connection with the London Passenger Transport Board. Nor is there any attempt to secure the representation of sectional interests, as in the Port of London Authority. But ministers are required to have regard to certain qualifications in appointing men to the highest positions. Thus, the chairman and members of the National Coal Board are to be selected from persons who have had experience of and have shown ability in industry, commerce, finance, applied science, administration, or labor organization.

There is considerable diversity in the size, tenure, and character of boards. In all the earlier models the idea prevailed that the members should be part-time directors, though the chairman was usually full-time except in the case of the British Broadcasting Corporation. The intention was to obtain the services of men of established reputation and wide experience to decide matters of general policy, leaving executive responsibility to a chief executive who was sometimes but not always a member of the board. Government practice in this matter has often followed unthinkingly in the footsteps of commercial companies, who frequently appoint eminent nonentities to their boards in order to inspire investors with confidence and hence to maintain the market prices of their shares. The weakness of a part-time board consisting of busy men of affairs giving only a fraction of their time to the business of the public corporation and often dominated by a chairman or chief executive of strong personality has become increasingly evident in some of the older examples, such as the London Passenger Transport Board and the BBC. The idea is gaining ground that a functional board of full-time executives is necessary for the conduct of great industries. And so the National Coal Board consists of a chairman and eight other full-time members each of whom is in charge of a particular branch of the work, though responsibility for the industry rests with the board collectively. The Transport Commission and the British Electricity Authority are expected to follow the same principle.

It must be admitted that considerable difficulty exists in finding suitable men for these key positions. The task of running a great na-

tionalized industry or of building a new town requires qualities of a very high order which are by no means necessarily the same as those needed for success in private business or industry or for outstanding achievement in the Civil Service. Yet these are the sources of recruitment to which ministers naturally tend to look. We shall no doubt in course of time train a new type of executive who will have a new outlook, new methods, and new techniques. Meantime, we have to get along as best we can with the existing material. But one has grave doubts as to the suitability of some of the most "obvious" appointments; and graver doubts as to the willingness of ministers to take chances or to use their imagination in making appointments.

In my view democratic principle makes it essential that the boards of these public corporations should be broadly acceptable to the ministers of the day. This certainly does not mean, in the framework of English public life, that a spoils system should or will prevail or a general clearance take place on a change of Government. Rather, it means that in the event of a serious conflict between a corporation and the Government the latter would have the means of making its will prevail—in the last resort by changing some or even all the members of a board.

The present position in this respect is that in most instances a member can be removed for misconduct, absence abroad, or inability. The New Towns Act in addition enables the Minister of Town and Country Planning to remove any member of a development corporation whom he is satisfied "is otherwise unable or unfit to discharge the functions of a member, or is unsuitable to continue as a member."² This gives the minister almost unlimited discretion. At the other extreme we find the Bank of England, whose directors are appointed for a fixed term of four years, subject to any disqualification which may be imposed by the bank's charter. A common legislative practice is to require board members to hold and vacate office in accordance with the terms of their instruments of appointment. This may enable a minister to appoint a member until such time as he is asked to resign. A preferable method is that adopted in the Coal Industry Nationalisation

² New Towns Act, 1946. 9 & 10 Geo. 6, Ch. 68.

Act whereby the minister may make regulations with regard to the tenure and vacation of office by board members. This should give the minister all the power he needs but require him to exercise it openly and in a somewhat formal manner.

The size of the boards varies among the several corporations. It may well be that the optimum number of members will depend to some extent on the character of the undertaking. An important point to notice in this connection is that in some instances the legislature prescribes a fixed number of members on a board; in others it merely defines an upper and a lower limit; in yet others it states only a maximum. Thus, the National Coal Board must consist of a chairman and eight other members; the court of directors of the Bank of England numbers sixteen, together with the governor and deputy governor. Each of the air transport corporations, on the other hand, has a board numbering not fewer than three nor more than nine members, exclusive of the chairman and deputy chairman, as the minister may determine from time to time. Examples of the third type are the development corporations whose boards may not exceed seven ordinary members, the proposed British Electricity Authority which may not have more than six ordinary members, and the Central Land Board, whose membership may not exceed ten. If a minister appoints a board of the second or third type mentioned above well below the maximum permitted strength, he can always add to its numbers at a later stage if he desires to promote a particular policy or to swamp any element on the board with which he disagrees. I do not think this was the intention behind these provisions, but it offers an obvious opportunity for Governmental influence.

The salaries paid to the board members reveal a tendency to work out at higher levels than those prevailing in the top ranks of the Civil Service but below those paid to outstanding commercial and industrial leaders in private enterprise.³ It is only very occasionally

that one hears of men refusing invitations to serve on the boards of public corporations on the ground of inadequate salaries, though there are many instances where acceptance has involved the appointee in a financial loss. The extremely high rates of income tax may have something to do with this relative indifference to financial reward, but the prestige, importance, and interest of the work of the public corporation is probably a more potent factor in attracting men of outstanding ability.

The staffing of the corporations has not on the whole presented such difficult problems as the board appointments. The corporations are free from Civil Service regulations regarding their personnel, although ministers are beginning to show an interest in the salary scales fixed by the boards for their employees. A corporation which offers higher rates of pay than those prevailing elsewhere may not only lead to unwelcome demands for a leveling up to those high rates but may also increase the taxpayer's liability. BOAC, for example, which has hitherto been operating on a substantial deficiency grant from the Treasury, was for long paying its W/T and radio operating staff higher rates than the Air Ministry or Post Office for similar grades. There are obvious disadvantages in such a situation.

The Government's views on this question as related to the BBC have recently been stated in the White Paper on *Broadcasting Policy* (Cmd. 6852/1946). They are that "in staff matters, the Corporation should retain the general independence which it now possesses, and Government control should be restricted to laying down broad limits of policy within which it should work; nevertheless, the Corporation has been informed that, while it is not rigidly bound to relate the salaries and conditions of employment of its permanent staff to those ruling in the Civil Service, it should, in fixing such salaries and conditions, pay proper regard to those of the Civil Service and to the greater security offered by employment in a Public Corporation, as compared with employment in most business concerns."⁴ It may be assumed that this view would apply equally to the staffs of other corporations.

The corporations engaged in operating na-

³ The chairman of the National Coal Board receives £8,000 a year; the chairman of BOAC £7,000; and the chairman of BEAC £6,000. The other members of the Coal Board get £4,000. The top salaries in the Civil Service are £3,500, except the permanent secretary to the Treasury who receives £3,750.

⁴ *Broadcasting Policy*, Cmd. 6852 (H. M. Stationery Office, 1946), p. 9.

tionalized industry will clearly have to choose a considerable proportion of their managing and technical personnel from the ranks of those with previous experience of the industry. In civil aviation, BOAC, BEAC, and BSAAC are drawing heavily on the large numbers of men and women who served with distinction during the war in the RAF, the Fleet Air Arm, and the Air Transport Auxiliary. But civil aviation differs entirely in its outlook, methods, and objects from military aviation, and elaborate retraining courses are required for almost everyone.

The development corporations have by far the hardest personnel problem. What kind of a staff should one assemble to embark on the exciting adventure of building a new town? It is difficult to specify strictly relevant experience. Job analysis breaks down. The easy assumption that engineering comes next to godliness in such a task fades away after a little reflection. Obviously a team is needed, but what sort of a team? One could fill a dozen pages in discussing this one problem.

III

ALL the public corporations referred to in this article are liable to a much greater degree of ministerial intervention that was applied to similar prewar institutions. The principle that the minister who is responsible to Parliament for a particular industry or service should be able to determine the policy of the public corporations which are operating it is firmly held by the Government and their supporters in Parliament. I have been informed by more than one minister that the views I expressed on this subject in *Public Enterprise*, published in 1937, have influenced the course of events. "Apart from control in time of emergency, ministerial influence in the conduct of these public boards should remain restricted to major questions of policy" (p. 381). The relinquishment of ministerial responsibility to Parliament for the day-to-day administration of these boards does not in any way dispense with the necessity for retaining the right of ultimate Government control in time of emergency or in case of abuse of power or dereliction of duty. "In appropriate cases a minister should have the power to issue regulations of a

general or particular character appertaining to the service" (p. 382).

All the recent legislation dealing with nationalized industries and services has given ministers a power of this kind. The Minister of Fuel and Power is authorized, after consultation with the National Coal Board, to give it directions of a general character relating to matters appearing to him to affect the national interest. Furthermore, in framing its programs of reorganization or development involving substantial capital expenditures the board is required to act on lines settled from time to time with the approval of the minister. The same principle applies to training, education, and research in the coal industry. A similar power of giving general direction to the air transport corporations is vested in the Minister of Civil Aviation. The transport bill will confer powers of the same kind on the Minister of Transport; and the electricity bill contains corresponding provisions. The Treasury may give such directions to the Bank of England as, after consultation with the Governor of the Bank, they think necessary in the public interest. In addition, Government departments are given many specific powers of control over the corporations, particularly in regard to financial matters, audit, borrowing, the disposal of any surplus or profit, the form of the accounts, and so forth. Each board normally makes an annual report to the minister, who lays it before Parliament.

If further evidence were wanted of the tendency toward increased Governmental control, it could be found in the recent change in the position of the Forestry Commission. From its establishment in 1919 to 1945, one of the forestry commissioners was a private Member of Parliament who answered questions in the House of Commons for the commission. The commission made an annual report direct to Parliament; its accounting officer was summoned each year to appear before the Public Accounts Committee. Under the Forestry Act, 1945, the Minister of Agriculture in England and Wales and the Secretary of State for Scotland are made the responsible ministers and the commission is required to comply with any directions they may give.

If ministers are to exercise their powers of direction and control wisely, they will have to

think out the fundamental question of the proper relation between a Government department and a nationalized industry. It is quite different from the relationship between even a specialized economic department and an industry under capitalist ownership and management. Except in wartime, the Ministry of Transport, for example, or the Mines Department of the Board of Trade (which was the predecessor of the Ministry of Fuel and Power) possessed relatively little knowledge of, and still less power over, the inland transport and fuel industries. They were sincerely anxious to nurse and to aid those industries and to protect the public interest at a few conventional points. But so far as the organization, the economic efficiency, or the technical adequacy of the collieries, the railways, the canals, the ports, and the harbors was concerned, the departments were ignorant, ill-equipped, timid, and indifferent. They felt it was just not their business to meddle in these matters or even to know about them.

A revolutionary change of outlook is required in the departments dealing with nationalized industries and services. There are already signs of such a change. The Ministry of Civil Aviation, for example, is being laid out on lines which will enable it to play an authoritative part in the planning of new air services and in fostering development and research in all aspects of civil aviation. It will have a fully competent administrative, technical, and professional staff to deal with civil airfields, which it will manage directly, together with air traffic control and telecommunication services. The main spearhead for the development and production of large civil transport aircraft will be the Ministry of Supply, acting in close conjunction with the Ministry of Civil Aviation and the operating corporations, though the design and manufacture will be conducted by the aircraft industry.

The essential functions of a Government department dealing with a nationalized industry are to measure its performance, to see that it keeps technically up-to-date and economically efficient, and to ensure that it is operated in such a manner as to provide the greatest amount of service to the largest possible number of consumers at the minimum cost consistent with financial self-support. To do these

things effectively it must regard its own planning, research, statistics, intelligence, and audit functions as of supreme importance. Here again, large changes of outlook and advances in technique are required on the part of Government departments.

IV

THE price policy of nationalized industries is a very large subject which demands the serious attention of economists. The assumption underlying the nationalization of coal mining, electricity supply, inland transport, and air lines is that these industries can and must be self-supporting, and that some or all of them may produce a surplus or profit forthwith or in the course of time. It is also believed that the new towns will eventually provide an adequate return on the capital expended and that the large outlay of public money on the acquisition of development rights in land will be recouped by the charges made to approved developers by the Central Land Board. The Bank of England has for long been virtually a gilt-edged security and the Chancellor of the Exchequer stated that the public had made a very good bargain with the shareholders.

At the same time, it is recognized that very large sums will have to be advanced from public funds for the purpose of capital development and also, in the case of the air lines, to meet annual deficits in the first few years of operation on many international routes.

The National Coal Board has a statutory duty to pursue a policy which will insure that its revenues shall suffice to meet outgoings properly chargeable to revenue account (including debt charges on compensation paid for expropriation and on sums advanced by the Government to finance capital expenditure) on an average of good and bad years. This policy must be pursued consistently with the proper discharge of the board's other duties, which include "making supplies of coal available, of such qualities and sizes, in such quantities and at such prices, as may seem to them best calculated to further the public interest in all respects, including the avoidance of any undue or unreasonable preference or advantage."³ This obligation will leave the board

³ Coal Industry Nationalisation Act, 1946. 9 & 10 Geo. 6, Ch. 59, sec. 1.

with a very wide latitude as to price policy, provided it manages to break even over a course of years. It will permit a differentiation between prices for export and home consumption; between coal sold for industrial purposes and for domestic use; between coal sold for consumption near the pithead and that sold to consumers at a greater distance. Any financial surplus may go either to a reserve fund or to such statutory purposes as the board may determine or the minister may direct with the approval of the Treasury. The air transport corporations, on the other hand, may be required to hand over any excess revenues which they may make to the Exchequer.

The transport and electricity bills follow the general pattern of the Coal Industry Nationalisation Act except that a general reserve fund is to be established by the British Transport Commission to prevent frequent fluctuations in transport charges.

Within the framework of this broad obligation to be economically self-supporting, the public corporations will be largely free to determine their own price policies. There will be as much room for diversity and experimentation, for undercharging and overcharging different classes of consumers and different categories of goods or services, as exists under private enterprise. The price and profit mechanism will remain of great importance but it may be overshadowed by larger questions of public policy. For example, the overseas air services can be developed either with the object of providing very fast and luxurious aircraft at very high fares or with the aim of promoting cheap mass travel at moderate speeds under simpler conditions. The two types might be equally profitable. The North Atlantic shipping companies of all countries have in the past concentrated on the former object but a public corporation might well prefer the latter on grounds of public policy.

One of the interesting features of the Civil Aviation Act, 1946, is that it breaks away from the idea of the single monopoly which had hitherto been set up in every instance where national ownership of an industry or a public utility had been introduced in Britain. BOAC was originally set up in 1939 to take over and operate British overseas air services throughout the world. Only after a long struggle inside

the Air Ministry and the Ministry of Civil Aviation was this arrangement replaced by three separate corporations, which may in due course be joined by others. It is true that the air transport corporations will not compete with one another directly since they will fly different routes, but there will be indirect rivalry between the independent managements. In any event there will be less danger of uniformity and more likelihood of diversity and experimentation in both the technical and administrative spheres. Direct competition in the air will come, as regards the overseas routes, from foreign air lines.

The determination of the optimum size of the operating unit is a matter of the first importance in relation to nationalization. The hasty and ill-considered assumption by many English Socialists that a national monopoly is inevitably the right solution shows that they do not understand the problem. A test case will occur when the gas industry is placed under national ownership in accordance with the Government's declared policy. The Heyworth Committee—an official nonpolitical committee presided over by a leading industrialist—recommended that there should be autonomous gas boards set up in ten great regions. The committee rejected entirely the idea of a national gas corporation, on the ground that there are no important problems in the industry which are by their very nature nationwide. "It is not economically possible for gas to be provided everywhere; a national grid is not practicable; nor can selling prices usefully be determined on a national basis. Complete centralisation can therefore safely be rejected as inappropriate."⁶ It will be interesting to see whether the Government adopts the committee's proposals for decentralized control and multiple operating units.

V

IT CAN be seen that Parliament plays a decisive part in embodying nationalization policy in legislation. The public corporations owe their existence to statutes which not only lay down the purposes, functions, and duties they are to carry out but also clothe them with powers of the most ample character. So wide

⁶ *The Gas Industry, Report of the Committee of Enquiry*, Cmd. 6699 (H. M. Stationery Office, 1945), p. 41.

are these powers, indeed, that judicial control by the courts is likely to be of rare occurrence and marginal importance.

Parliament will not be able to exercise effective control or supervision over the operations of the public corporations. The time at the disposal of the House of Commons for this purpose and its procedure do not permit of any real supervision over the administration of even the regular departments, let alone such comparatively extraneous bodies as these corporations. For the task of general supervision and direction on questions of major policy we must look to ministers and their departments. Even for them it will be no easy task.

In most cases, though not all, the consumer is provided with some extra-Parliamentary and nonpolitical mechanism by which he can air his grievances and bring complaints. The coal industry is to have an Industrial Coal Consumers' Council and a Domestic Coal Consumers' Council composed of representatives of the Coal Board and of the interests concerned. These councils are to consider and to report to the minister on any matter affecting the supply of coal and allied fuels, and it will be for him to take the necessary action, where a defect is disclosed in the board's general arrangements, by giving it the appropriate directions. Each council will have its own staff and will report annually to Parliament. Regional councils can also be appointed.

In the field of civil aviation an Air Transport Advisory Council has been set up. It will consider representations respecting the adequacy of the facilities provided by the corporations and the charges made for them. It will also examine any question of a similar kind referred to it by the minister. The council reports its conclusions and recommendations to the minister. The Air Transport Council, like the Coal Consumers' Councils, is advisory to the minister. He appoints the members and provides them with staff, accommodations, information, and such other assistance as he thinks expedient. It is for him to take whatever action is called for by their investigations.

Bodies of this type may provide a safety valve which will permit dissatisfied members of the public to let off steam. The advisory council will also possess a certain detachment from both the Government department and

the public corporation concerned with an industry. Hence it may be able to give disinterested judgment on complaints and offer valuable advice as to remedies. But it is in no sense an administrative tribunal or a regulatory commission. Only time will show whether it provides a sufficient safeguard for the interests and legitimate grievances of the consumer.

The electricity bill provides for an elaborate network of consultative councils to represent consumer interests in the area of every regional area board. Each council will consist of from twenty to thirty persons, of whom not fewer than half will be appointed from among members of local authorities. The remainder will represent consumers of electricity and other persons or organizations interested in its development.

The duty of a council is to consider any matter affecting the distribution of electricity in its area, including the variation of tariffs and the provision of new or improved services and facilities. The matter may come before it by way of complaint or otherwise; it is also free to act on its own initiative. It is to be kept informed of the area board's general plans and arrangements; and the area board is required to consider the reports and recommendations made by its consultative council. If the council is not satisfied with the action taken or agreed to be taken by the area board it can go higher and make representations to the central British Electricity Authority, which can then give directions to the area board to remedy the defect which has been disclosed.

The transport bill continues the long-established tradition in the field of railway operation of conferring regulatory and judicial powers on an administrative tribunal. The Railway and Canal Commission, an obsolete and muscle-bound court of antiquated design, is to be abolished and its jurisdiction transferred to the Railway Rates Tribunal (set up under the Railways Act, 1921), which will be renamed the Transport Tribunal. The British Transport Commission will submit charges schemes to the tribunal for confirmation. Subsequently the tribunal may alter any charges scheme at the request of interested parties and the minister may at any time require the tribunal to review the working of a scheme.

VI

HERE in brief outline are the basic conceptions and the administrative framework in which the nationalization program of the Labour Government is embodied. Great problems are raised by these measures—problems of administrative organization, of economic policy, of personnel management, of ministerial supervision, of consumer control, of the relations between the nationalized and privately owned sectors of the economy. We shall not know the answers for several years. It will probably take almost a decade before it will be pos-

sible to state authoritatively whether the policy of nationalization is working out successfully in the long run, at least so far as transport, coal, and electricity are concerned.

In the meantime, the British people have embarked on a series of experiments of immense importance to the whole western world. The outcome of those experiments will probably exert a profound influence on the course of public policy in many countries. For the practitioner and student of public administration, Britain is today a "theater of operations" of intense interest.

A Plea for Administrative Decentralization

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THE postwar federal budget is approximately forty billion dollars. The last pre-war federal budget was approximately nine billions. Annual expenditures of state and local governments combined have remained roughly stable over this period and amount to about thirteen billions. The implication in terms of political centralization is obvious. With federal expenditures rising from 70 to 300 per cent of the outlay of all other governmental units, a new era of vastly increased federal administrative activity is inevitable.

Although the writer six years ago expressed a strong faith in the values of local self-government,¹ and although since then administrative experience in more centralized European countries has increased rather than decreased that faith, he does not feel that American constitutional government is necessarily endangered by the great acceleration in fiscal and administrative activity on the federal level. Safeguards are desirable, of course—safeguards in the interest both of public control and of operative efficiency. Improvement of legislative machinery—toward which happily a beginning is being made—is desirable. Improvement of the party mechanism is desirable. A fuller and clearer publication of the federal government's financial activity is desirable. And certain technical administrative improvements are desirable. It is with one of these technical improvements that this article is concerned—the mechanism of administrative decentralization.

Parenthetically, a limitation of subject should be here inserted. The following discussion is not primarily concerned with the political decentralization inherent in the American federal-state-local system. It is concerned almost

solely with administrative decentralization by place, omitting the other significant types of decentralization which occur. It is concerned with those elements of organization and procedure which will enable more governmental work—including the power to make decisions—to be achieved on the lower levels of the structure. This article will attempt to summarize some of the more general advantages and disadvantages claimed for administrative decentralization before presenting some suggestions for eliminating or modifying what seem to be basic incompatibilities between two groups of administrative thinkers.²

Arguments for Decentralization

THE most casual student of administrative efficiency can see around him examples of the effectiveness of administrative decentralization and of the ineffectiveness of excessive administrative centralization. Prohibition enforcement was highly centralized and we all know the sad story of a program which received little public cooperation. The Civil Works Administration and the Resettlement Administration both attempted a highly centralized administration of important social programs—and both bit the dust promptly. The Federal Public Housing Authority gained strength when it began to decentralize authority. The Army Service Forces in its effort to save manpower commenced in midwar a great drive for decentralization which political scientists could

² In another essay the writer is presenting a fuller checklist of the many technical considerations which affect the desirable degree of centralization under varying circumstances. The points given in this article are less detailed and more general in application. As a result, of course, they may not be relevant in any specific governmental situation.

¹ George C. S. Benson, *The New Centralization* (Farar and Rinehart, 1941), 181 pp.

have told them they needed long before.³ Even the lawyers have recognized that the federal government needs to decentralize, as both majority and minority reports of the Attorney-General's Committee on Administrative Procedure indicated. And, finally, that world-wide conflict between totalitarianism and free capitalism which is usually considered from an ideological viewpoint can furnish important administrative lessons. Competent observers of the Soviet governmental machinery are convinced that much of Russian inefficiency stems from the rigidity of centralized control. On the other hand, large American business corporations such as General Motors have decentralized their administration among the constituent units to a greater degree than is perhaps popularly realized.

It is perhaps possible to isolate from the admittedly complex combination of elements that constitute "good administration" a few specific reasons why decentralization is advantageous.

1. *Speed and Efficiency.* While advocates of centralization maintain that speed of modern communications has almost eliminated the delays involved in central clearance, anyone who has worked in a wartime agency knows that the case is not so simple as that.⁴ Telegraph and telephone do, obviously, help to expedite clearance, but delay is still inevitable when members of the central office staff are required to pass on cases with which they are not personally familiar, when cases must be cleared with several separate staff divisions in the central office even after having been cleared with regional levels of the same divisions, when too many persons with little or no immediate interest are encouraged to contribute their "viewpoints" on each field problem. There are situations in which the necessity for uniformity of policy or the necessity of guarding against maladministration may justify the time consumed in headquarters clearance; there are far more cases where top administrators have contended that these necessities exist in order to justify their habit of central clearance. But on the whole, experience indicates that the decisions

thus reached are not so superior as to compensate for the waste of time in settling the field problem or for the waste of the time of the central staff.

2. *Internal Coordination and Responsibility.* The average citizen grumbling about his inability to find the government official who can really make a decision in his case probably does not realize that his troubles are shared by government workers themselves. As one of my fellow workers in OPA once expressed it: "As soon as a man becomes so important that you have to clear with him, he's never in his office to be cleared with." The real trouble is that back of the little man who isn't there is a whole panel of men who *are* there—the battery of legal, financial, business, social policy, and technical experts whose function it is to approve each specialized aspect of each problem. Human nature being what it is, the job of securing concurrence from all of these persons within a reasonably brief time is tremendous.

It is possible to overcome some of this difficulty by a careful organization of functions which leaves individual problems largely or entirely within the jurisdiction of certain staff divisions. It is also possible to work out careful mechanisms of coordination on the central level. But undoubtedly effective decentralization is one of the best remedies. On the lower levels specialists are likely to have more intimate and frequent contacts with each other and with their operating supervisor, so that informal agreement is more likely. Jurisdictional conflicts thrive in large headquarters—and weaken rapidly in the enforced on-the-job cooperation of field offices. If the wildlife and recreation specialists on a United States Forest in Montana had to report back to Washington divisions before deciding on a joint use program of a particular game and recreation area, the future of joint use programs would be gloomy indeed. Fortunately, specialists and supervisors in the Forest Service solve most of their problems without recourse to regional or Washington divisions, and the success of their programs bears testimony to the value of the structure under which they operate.

Effective decentralization encourages a sense of cooperation among coordinates; it also develops a sense of responsibility in the operating head. When work is too highly centralized, it

³ Richard Leighton, *History of the Control Division, ASF, Army Service Forces*, 1946. Mimeographed.

⁴ Cf. David B. Truman, *Administrative Decentralization* (University of Chicago Press, 1940), p. 88.

is easy for a fieldman to "pass the buck" to Washington. Sometimes, of course, the fault *does* lie in Washington, but sometimes the fact of his dependency on a central office for final instructions lessens the sense of responsibility in the regional or district director and he becomes slovenly about sending in full and adequate reports or about outlining with precision the problems to be solved. If the local director knows that he is personally responsible for the activities in his area, there is far greater incentive to push for the necessary information, to solve the difficulties within his office and between his office and Washington, and to take the initiative in expediting action at all points.

It is true that in some situations political or legal complications may make such delegation of authority undesirable. On the whole, most regulatory agencies have felt this to be the case. David B. Truman has given us an interesting account of the way in which rigid centralization of legal services in the Department of Agriculture has prevented speedy and coordinated action in law enforcement in the Chicago offices⁵—an account which proves again that, whatever the justification for rigid centralized control, the purely administrative effects are undesirable.

3. *Administrative Experimentation and Adaptation.* Experimentation is much easier, and much more likely to occur, in an administratively decentralized arrangement where a promising, but untried, idea may be put into use in a single district and there evaluated before being widely adopted. The Forest Service, for instance, developed its work measurement program and its in-service training in sample regions before adopting them generally, and the Bureau of Old-Age and Survivors Insurance has used a region as a laboratory for a scheme of persuading individuals to keep their social security cards.

In these cases the projects were initiated by the central staff, but at other times field offices have been responsible for the new ideas and have sponsored their testing under the sympathetic supervision of the originators. Sometimes these "experiments" are little more than means by which enterprising field administrators demonstrate the obvious to an unreceptive central office. An example was an experiment

in the New York region of the OPA to show that state field offices were not essential. Sometimes the experiment is the work of an enterprising field administrator in filling in the policy gaps left by an unrealistic or unenterprising central headquarters. The many regulations worked out by Colonel Charles Poletti's staff in various military government regions in Italy and adopted subsequently by headquarters Allied Control Commission are examples of how a good field staff will help to fill a vacuum left by an inept or ineffective headquarters. But there are also many other cases in which a field staff embarks on an experiment with previous knowledge and blessing of the headquarters staff.

4. *External Coordination.* Although it is true that coordination of the work of a federal agency with the work of other federal agencies, of state and local governments, and of large private associations must, in terms of top policy, be effected through the central administrator's office, it is also true that fruitful day-by-day coordination must come at lower levels. It is at these lower levels that the mass of transactions which will be benefited by integration with other agencies occur, and it is at the level of origin that the integration must take place if speedy, smooth, effective functioning is desired.

The writer's experience with federal agencies indicates that the more decentralized agencies have in general secured more intimate contact with state and local agencies. The group of agencies in the Department of Agriculture which have decentralized substantially are far more intimately connected with state governments than are similar agencies in the more centralized Department of the Interior. The Social Security Board with its greater central control is much further from establishing a common social welfare policy with states and private agencies than is the Department of Agriculture from establishing common agricultural policies. The Bureau of Internal Revenue, now in the early stages of a slow decentralization, is contemporaneously beginning to establish contact with some state agencies.⁶ Many policy-determining factors, such as

⁵ *Op. cit.*, p. 115.

⁶ See *Federal, State, and Local Government Fiscal Relations*. Senate Document No. 69, 78th Cong., 1st sess. (1943), pp. 141-149.

the nature of the work, the presence or absence of grants-in-aid, and the degree of public acceptance, affect the amount of decentralization and the degree of external coordination needed. But the correlation of decentralization and external coordination remains indisputable.

5. *Development of Line Executives.* One need only contrast a decentralized organization like the Forest Service with a more centrally controlled one like the Park Service to see how decentralization aids the development of all-around supervisors—men who have through experience in field or regional offices learned to integrate the ideas of various staff specialists to produce a workable and satisfactory administrative program. Almost any organization which has a large field staff with some genuine decentralization will in time have staffed most of its policy-making central office positions with men who have through field experience learned to see the forest of total program in spite of the trees of specialist viewpoints. One can almost say that no administrative organization has matured until it is able to bring some men with such experience into its central headquarters.

It is, of course, true that in many agencies there is relatively little movement of staff from field to Washington. Truman in his study of the Department of Agriculture field offices in Chicago reports that this was the situation there, and studies of other agencies would undoubtedly reveal the same fact. However, it must be borne in mind that the existence of field offices is not synonymous with administrative decentralization. Initiative among field staffs will not develop unless a reasonable amount of authority is entrusted to staff members and unless there is a reasonable chance that their thoughtful suggestions and plans will be put into practice. In fact, too rigid a centralization will tend to drive abler employees out of governmental field service. But where, as in the Food and Drug Administration, decentralization has been actual, not merely nominal, field offices have proved effective training grounds.⁷

6. *Economy of Operations.* Superficially it may seem surprising that the Army Service Forces included decentralization as one major part of its drive to save manpower. It has fre-

quently been assumed that the establishment of field offices greatly increases personnel needs, yet in practice the opposite may prove true. Undoubtedly when governmental functions such as centralized accounting, research, and record-keeping can be performed in one place, it is more economical to do so, but by far the greater proportion of governmental work by its nature must be to some extent decentralized in order to permit contact with the job or with the citizens concerned. In other words, some field staff is essential. When a field staff exists, it is usually true that decentralization which will permit settling of normal routine cases on the lower level and which will eliminate the consideration of such cases by two or three levels of reviewing staff is effective in saving time and manpower.

Less important but by no means insignificant is the reduction of travel costs made possible when regular inspectional or supervisory visits can be made from regional or district offices. It can also be argued that the supervision will be closer, more informed, less perfunctory or arbitrary when delegated to an intermediate office with a more limited supervisory span.

7. *Reduction of Administrative Detail at Headquarters.* Related to the economy of manpower just discussed is the removal of a vast mass of detailed work from the shoulders of headquarters staff by an effective decentralization program. Certain functions are more satisfactorily handled by a central staff, but on the whole most Washington agencies should be confined to what the Army calls "general staff activities." They—and indeed many state and local head offices—should concentrate upon establishing main policies and upon the supervision of the operating offices to see that the policies are carried out. It is obvious that the central agency will have more time to plan and to supervise if the bulk of operating detail is kept out of Washington by an efficient decentralization. Military agencies and some civilian agencies have demonstrated that thinking and doing can be separated if the essential interconnections are not lost and that both benefit by the separation.

8. *Improvement of Public Relations.* The existence of amiable relations between citizens and the governmental agencies serving them is obviously of great political and social impor-

⁷ Truman, *op. cit.*, pp. 98-103.

tance. It is also of great importance purely as a matter of administrative efficiency. Experience seems to indicate clearly that there is a high correlation between public cooperation in a program and the degree of decentralization in the administration of that program. TVA, whose flooding of broad acres of good farm land, advocacy of public ownership of power, and support of other political and economic "heresies" would seem essentially impalatable, has won large public backing. TVA is, of course, geographically rooted in the area concerned and has fostered in its staff an intense sense of community participation which has cemented public acceptance. Selective Service carried out a most unpopular job with a minimum of criticism. The Selective Service Act was administered largely by committees of local residents. The Department of Agriculture had learned that substantial decentralization of controls promotes public acceptance; because it was decentralized, it could work out such a popular program as the farmer-elected AAA committees.

It is difficult to analyze all the elements which go into making decentralized agencies more popular, but it is possible to note a few factors. In the first place, there is the basic factor of physical convenience for the citizen who is dealing with the agency. The payer of a federal income tax, for example, who can see a responsible person in the Detroit office and get a decision about the amount of his tax is saved at least a day in time and a considerable amount of expense as compared with the person who must go to Washington. The high tax-paying morale of the British has sometimes been credited to decentralization of tax collection. The lumber buyer on the west coast who can negotiate an important deal with a regional Forest Service office in Ogden will thank his lucky stars that he is not forced to go to Washington.

Second, governmental experience seems to prove the reverse of the old adage that "familiarity breeds contempt." Where problems can be analyzed and settled, in the broad sense, by a neighbor, there seems to result a greater feeling of solidarity and a diminished sense of antagonism between citizen and public official. The postmaster who must write to Washington in order to effect a change of mail delivery

routes in a town of 2,000 cannot achieve so great an integration of public-private sympathies as if he himself is permitted to handle such local decisions.

Most subtle of all is the effect of decentralization on the government employee himself and the carryover from his attitude to the public. The field official who is running a decentralized program is on the spot; he sees the problems and the potentialities; he becomes absorbed in his work; he is less prone to sacrifice the goal and to play agency politics in order to jockey himself into a somewhat stronger position. Any soldier who served both in a field unit and in a large headquarters knows that the best elements of an officer's character come out on the lower level. Anyone who has observed TVA knows that there is far more interest in the job, far less concern over promotion, far less jealousy among divisions than in most Washington offices. The "average citizen" is sensitive to this situation even though he may not analyze it.

Arguments Against Administrative Decentralization

IN SPITE of these apparently overwhelming political and administrative arguments for decentralization, the federal government and most state governments are still highly centralized. Although in many governmental agencies a certain decentralized structure has been set up, in practice the American federal bureaucracy keeps a close control of power. Clearly there must be arguments against decentralization, and this article will now attempt to present some of the most important of these.

1. *Political Responsibility.* Curiously, just as proponents of decentralization stress its political advantages, opponents of decentralization stress its political dangers. Most Washington departments and bureaus contend that if field officers are given too much authority, they may make decisions which are politically perilous, the blame for which will come to rest, not on the regional or field office director, but on the politically responsible department or bureau head in Washington.

The danger of being saddled with politically compromising or professionally unsound decisions is particularly acute when local pressure groups gain control of district or regional of-

fices. Many agencies are far from free in the appointment of their lower-level directors. Some, like the Post Office and the Bureau of Internal Revenue, can appoint local directors only with the approval of Congress. Others, such as the Forest Service, may find their appointment of regional directors very carefully scrutinized by political powers in the region concerned. OPA even when recruiting a wartime staff had to secure political clearance of most of its state directors. Obviously when a local pressure group is in control of a field office it might prove disadvantageous both politically and professionally to entrust that office with too much authority.

2. *Weakened Lines of Technical Control.* There is sincere opposition to effective decentralization on the part of some technical specialists who feel that they cannot control their particular work without direct control of administrative operations. The chief counsel, for example, feels that he cannot carry out his responsibilities if he does not have immediate control over all prosecutions or other legal actions. The personnel director is sure that he cannot have an answer to the questions his superior officer may raise unless he has power to pass on all personnel matters. The social work director cannot be sure that case work receives its due share of attention if she does not have control over social work activities.

Most technical directors are willing to concede the desirability of establishing field offices and of placing all the work of a particular kind in such offices. But they are not sure that the field office director will recognize the importance of their particular technical lines, so they insist on maintaining a central office review of cases. Even in military organizations where there is substantial agreement on the principle of staff supervision, a number of specialist groups have insisted on reviewing all transactions of a particular kind at a lower level in the hierarchy.

3. *Lack of Qualified Personnel.* It is sometimes argued that personnel qualified to make over-all judgments are not available in the numbers needed for a thoroughgoing system of decentralization. One large federal bureau cut its projected number of regional offices in half because of the shortage of qualified directors. A more usual expedient is to withhold author-

ity from field offices because it is believed that the staffs are incompetent to exercise authority.

A field office to which no authority is delegated will not develop any latent administrative talents in its staff, and indeed able men will not stay in a field office where they have no scope for initiative. If there is at present a lack of qualified personnel, a policy of continued centralization will merely intensify the situation.

4. *Lack of Uniform Policy.* Decentralization of authority, its opponents argue, results in varying interpretations of statutes and regulations. This fact cannot be denied. To cite a single example, during the Allied military occupation of Italy, two field units, after receiving identical instructions on maintaining price levels, issued two sets of orders to the Italians which resulted in two price levels at times as much as 300 per cent apart.

The desire to insure uniform policies is supported by both political and legal considerations. If a congressman or newspaper or pressure group in Region I finds that the interpretation of a regulation in that region is less favorable than its interpretation in Region IV someone in the central office will unquestionably be in an embarrassing position. Moreover, in the United States the fear that an act or the regulations under an act may be held unconstitutional is another powerful force working for close central control to insure uniformly constitutional policies. This same attitude is back of the insistence of the legal divisions that all court prosecutions or all legal actions must be approved by the central office before action is started.

Resolution of Conflicting Points of View

WHEN there are such convincing arguments in favor of decentralization, it is well to inquire whether the difficulties and disadvantages attributed to it are insoluble or whether perhaps it is not possible to narrow the area of disagreement between proponents and opponents.

The arguments against decentralization can be reduced to three: it militates against uniformity of policy; it presupposes a group of professionally, politically, and administratively capable men far larger than can be procured;

it vitiates the effectiveness of specialist controls.

It cannot be denied that decentralization is not so conducive to uniformity of policy as is centralization. In fact, some of the advantages of decentralization listed above were its tendency to encourage experimentation, to facilitate local adaptation, and to develop the initiative of field administrators. While a very few agencies, such as the Bureau of Old-Age and Survivors Insurance, have managed to achieve uniformity while still conducting experiments, on the whole these two characteristics are not essentially compatible. An administrator weighing the question of decentralizing his agency would have to decide whether the program which he is administering would more generally benefit from strict uniformity or from flexibility and experimentation.

The political pros and cons are not quite so mutually exclusive. In some cases the marked advantage of a friendly clientele and of more intimate contact with large groups of citizens which results from strong field offices might outweigh the danger of occasional "political" mistakes by field or regional directors. In any event, the sort of field staffs which can be trusted politically, professionally, and administratively cannot be developed unless, after careful selective policies and broad training programs have been worked out, a substantial degree of responsibility is delegated to these staffs.

It has already been mentioned that the supply of able field officers as well as a reservoir of central office administrators depends upon a policy of decentralization which provides the maximum opportunity for development of the individuals holding administrative positions on the lower levels.

Perhaps the most controversial aspect of this problem of decentralization concerns the relative dominance of specialists and line administrators. The writer feels that this difficulty is by no means insoluble and will devote the rest of the article to what seems to him a feasible resolution of an unnecessary conflict.

Line-Staff Relationships

LINE-STAFF organization is an effective, though by no means simple, method of fitting specialist organizations into a unified program. At various levels (territorial or administra-

tive), appropriate specializations under "staff" men appear. At each level there is also a director of the entire program or "line" administrator whose duty it is to supervise the specialists and to coordinate their activity. Specialists on one level will be trained by, and in fairly constant communication with, specialists on higher levels. At lower levels where specialization disappears, the line administrator will receive supervision as to his specialist work from the specialist in the level next above him.

Line-staff organization is inevitable in any effective decentralization and, in fact, it has been given lip service by most federal agencies, although in too many cases the practices have rudely violated the entire basic principles of the system. It might therefore be profitable to point out some details of its effective functioning.

It is clear that in order to secure the advantages of both specialization and a unified program, a judicious balance between "line" (or over-all program) and "staff" (or specialist) elements must be preserved. Such a balance is not easy to secure. It requires the placing of "strong," well-informed men in both sides of the picture, but with a slightly greater emphasis on strength on the line side and on information on the staff side. It requires careful training of both line and staff personnel in the essence of the system—the thought patterns which are needed to make it go, the types of circumstances in which a line man should fight against "unreasonable" staff orders, the situations in which the staff man should fight against a "domineering" line executive. The Army interpretation of line-staff organization recognizes very specifically these occasions when battle is necessary. A line man is subject to orders from staff specialists on the next higher level (who partly in imagination, partly in truth are viewed as speaking for their line commander), but he also has the right at any time to go to the line commander and question the desirability of a staff order. He may do this questioning on his own or at the request of his staff subordinate. Whether or not he raises a question depends on his strength, his relationships with his line superior, the latter's confidence in staff advice—a series of psychological and social factors. Unless both line men and specialists have a fairly clear picture in their

minds of how line-staff administration is supposed to operate, it may easily go wrong.⁸

Frequently the United States governmental offices have been staffed by persons lacking broad administrative experience or flexible administrative imaginations. As a result, the line-staff system has been rather badly handled. In some agencies, such as OPA in its early days, there has been too much domination by line administrators who are suspicious of specialization, choke off communication between specialists at different levels, and try to "run things themselves." There are many regional and field offices in which the director tries to read all incoming correspondence and sign all outgoing correspondence, regardless of the fact that he has a staff there to help him on just such work.

A more frequent error in federal administration is overemphasis on the specialist side, which results in much of the overcentralization that has been noted. Americans are firm believers in "doing things the right way," which we usually interpret to be the *professionally* correct way. Accordingly, when a professional staff chief comes to an administratively inexperienced or a politically chosen agency head and says: "Sir, I know you want a good job done on the legal (or economic, or social, or

medical) side of this program. I can't guarantee you a good job unless I have direct control of field operations in my specialty," the agency head finds it difficult to resist the argument. If the administrator knew line-staff operations well, he could easily point out the possibilities of effective staff supervision, which he would himself support, and the greater usefulness of the legal or medical or economic viewpoint if it is effectively blended with other viewpoints at the district office level where the job is actually to be done. If he lacks this background, he usually gives in. Thus we find in the Social Security Board a "regional director" who has no authority except in the ill-defined field of public relations. In the National Park Service some forms of control are channeled through the regional director; others pass him by completely. Even in the integrated Forest Service there are lawyers in the regional offices who do not belong to the Forest Service, but come from the Office of the Solicitor of the Department of Agriculture.

The effect of this specialist authority on the field office is structurally bad. For one thing, specialists have a constant, sometimes almost unconscious drive to transform a system of organization by area into one of organization by process—largely because they are devoted to the language of their own specialty. Area organization has advantages which need not be repeated; but entirely aside from this fact, any office which ostensibly is based on one type of organization but is in process of internal transformation to another is clearly in a structurally confused state. The second point is closely related to the first. Especially in civilian agencies the authority of the line administrator is in constant jeopardy. A soldier inherently respects line authority; he is a soldier whether he is in charge of supplies or manning a machine gun. But a biologist considers himself a biologist, whatever agency he serves, and his respect follows staff channels. He tends to mistrust decisions of his nonspecialist administrative superior on matters affecting his specialty. Moreover, he looks to promotion in his own specialty and consequently is more interested in satisfying his staff than his line superior. These situations would not occur were the basic principles of line-staff organization understood and applied.

⁸A few lines from an account of the Forest Service line-staff system may be quoted here as an illustration of the necessity of balance to make this system work:

"The various functional lines must be kept in balance and held within their proper fields. Each function is defined as closely as possible, but borderline cases are continually coming up and shifting situations require constant watching.

"The relationship between the line of authority and the functional lines is exceedingly important. Briefly stated, the relationship is this: General policies are issued down the line of authority, and only down that line. Within the framework of established policies, a functional chief in Washington may issue instructions to the Regional Forester. While these instructions are addressed to the Regional Forester, as a rule they are automatically routed in the regional office to the appropriate functional chief. The Regional Forester instructs his functional chiefs as to what types of matters they are to take up with him, and it is then the responsibility of the regional functional chiefs to see to it that the Regional Forester is consulted on all such matters." Earl W. Loveridge and Peter Keplinger, "Washington-Field Relationships in the Forest Service," in *Washington-Field Relationships in the Federal Service* (Graduate School, U. S. Department of Agriculture, 1942), p. 25.

Specialist assumption of line control has other practical disadvantages. When specialist divisions cling to control of individual transactions in the field, that coordination of field work which is so important a value of decentralization is markedly handicapped.⁹ Moreover, specialist control tends to impede good public relations, speed of action, and the tendency toward experimentation.

Several devices are useful in maintaining the proper balance between line and staff. Some agencies have successfully used conferences at which line executives have an opportunity to criticize specialist policies. Obviously care should be taken that line men always have the opportunity to carry criticisms to their line superiors. The prestige of line executives should be enhanced by means of higher rank and salary than are enjoyed by specialists on the same level. A division of field operations within headquarters sometimes helps to strengthen the position of the line though it may have the disadvantage of keeping headquarters specialist divisions from adequate contact with the field.

Once the proper balance of line and staff is learned and lived in an administrative agency, the undoubted advantages of specialization can be combined with the undoubted advantages

of decentralization. Staff supervision can insure professional competence without the dangers of detailed operational control, and the line executive will give strong support both to his staff specialists and to his line subordinates.

Conclusion

THE writer feels very strongly that increased administrative decentralization in the federal government and the larger state governments is a most desirable step. He has no wish to raise in this article issues of political policy, or to burn in print for the millionth time the effigy of totalitarianism. Yet one of the outstanding lessons he learned from his contacts with the German and Russian and Italian systems is the long-run inefficiency of top-heavy administration. In the United States we have long prided ourselves that political democracy is advantageous not only in terms of the freedom of the individual but in terms of the general well-being of the state. We have said that citizens are made and not born and that a country filled with true citizens is politically, socially, and economically strong. In a somewhat similar way, administrative decentralization not only makes for the improvement of administrators; it also makes for the kind of speedy, effective, informed, and sympathetic administration of laws which breaks down the gap between governor and governed and eliminates the inflexibility and arbitrariness which have been the curse of all so-called "bureaucracies."

⁹ Alvin Roseman, "The Regional Coordination of Defense Health and Welfare Services," *Public Administration Review* 436 (Autumn, 1941). The writer is also judging from his own experiences as a member of the Michigan State Planning Commission.

Coordinating Staffs— Are They Really Dangerous?

By GEORGE W. BERGQUIST

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EXTERNAL mechanisms of coordination are the first consolation of a desperate executive, but the last bad hope of sound administration."¹ It is easy to attest to the grammatical neatness and perverse charm of this final sentence in Mr. Hogan's article in the Summer, 1946, issue of *Public Administration Review*, but impossible to acquiesce quietly to the declaration which the sentence clothes. Disclaiming any apparent flippancy, one is tempted to say that if Mr. Hogan is correct, there is hardly a large organization in the world which is not saddled with a desperate executive or cultivating a last bad hope. So one must dismiss the hyperbole in his concluding sentence, while giving serious thought and consideration to the implications of the broad thesis contained in the article itself.

The burden of Mr. Hogan's paper is that whatever has been the progress made in government in the centralization of responsibility and authority for getting a job done, it is being quietly and persistently compromised by what he calls a "dangerous tendency"—the tendency toward development of staff agencies for coordination, planning, and housekeeping services. These staff agencies, according to Mr. Hogan, are gradually usurping some of the basic prerogatives of the operating executives—through personnel ceiling control, space allocation, publications control, budget control, and the rest of the activities which have become so typical of coordinating staff organizations everywhere. Further, he detects in central housekeeping services, such as typist pools and duplicating units, the dangerous possibility that

their operation can become a means of control, even of irresponsible control, of the so-called line agencies. The growth of such agencies is dangerous and harmful, he says, in terms of the operating efficiency of the line or production departments, and ultimately in terms of the total product of the over-all organization. Their immediate symptoms are buck passing, delay, misunderstanding, and confusion, and the ultimate results are organizational weakness and even breakdown.

Now these are serious charges, particularly in view of the fact that the apparent need for and desirability of staff coordination and planning agencies are being attested to in a growing number of organization charts. The trend toward centralized administrative services (or housekeeping agencies) is likewise unmistakable.

What, then, does Mr. Hogan's thinking represent? Can the broad terms of his attack on "external mechanisms of coordination" be justified, on examination of the facts? Or, if his strictures on coordination agencies and housekeeping services are considered separately, is a significant distinction discernible—a distinction which may serve to verify a part of his argument? Is he attacking staff agencies per se, on the basis of an examination of their pathology alone?

The answers to these questions can perhaps best be discovered by examining several others, and their implications. What is the theoretical basis of the partitioning and delegation of responsibility and authority in an organization?²

¹ Willard N. Hogan, "A Dangerous Tendency in Government," 6 *Public Administration Review* 239 (1946).

² I use the words "authority" and "responsibility" separately and advisedly, though not in any special sense, since I am aware of numerous instances where a

What are the peculiar functions of the executive in an organization?

The remarks which follow represent only a preliminary and elementary examination of these questions. The field of inquiry that they imply is broad, complex, and still largely uncharted. As far as I know, the theory of governmental administrative organization has not been studied specifically, though the writings of some students of business organization are more than slightly cogent. It is a subject which invites further study.

First, a few words on the nature and functions of the executive in an organization and on the nature of organization itself. The only legitimate purpose of organization is to distribute responsibility and authority systematically among a number of people, to get a job done better, faster, and more economically than it could be done by one man or by a number of men working separately and independently. In a very small organization the lines of communication are few and short and relationships are relatively simple, unless there are special conditions such as geographical dispersal and problems of personal harmony (which is to say that the *form* of an organization is perhaps as much a resultant as it is a causal factor, or an invariably pre-existent one). As an organization grows, even where there are no special circumstances as such, it becomes more and more essential that the allocation of authority and responsibility be formalized and clarified. As the lines of communication lengthen and as internal relationships become more numerous and more subtle, it becomes increasingly necessary that the supervisor of every department, division, section, and unit understand clearly the nature and boundaries of the work of his organizational segment.

Inefficiencies and difficulties increase geometrically as misunderstanding and indecision are permitted to persist in a growing organization. As the organization grows, it becomes increasingly difficult for every supervisor, let alone every individual employee, to consult

man or an organization has been held *responsible* for achieving certain results, though not actually in possession of enough or the right kind of *authority* to accomplish the mission, regardless of the sincerity of motives and the depth of loyalty.

the executive when thorny problems arise. The historic answer is that responsibility and authority are formally delegated and re-delegated downward—usually in a hierarchical pattern, the individual segments growing smaller with each descending level of organization. This process of distribution is subtle, sophisticated, and significant; the executive ordinarily gives much thought and time to it.

However, it is not the primary purpose of this brief paper to examine the theory of the delegation of authority and responsibility within an organization. Rather, main interest centers on the rationalization of those elements of authority and responsibility which must remain with the executive himself. What are his just and necessary prerogatives, and what are his unique contributions to the organization's functioning?

The search for answers to these questions can best be launched by citing several quotations from Chester I. Barnard, *The Functions of the Executive*:³

... it follows that the functions of executives relate to all the work essential to the vitality and endurance of an organization, so far, at least, as it must be accomplished through formal coördination (p. 215).

... Executive work is not that of the organization, but the specialized work of *maintaining* the organization in operation (p. 215).

The essential executive functions . . . are, first, to provide the system of communication; second, to promote the securing of essential efforts; and, third, to formulate and define purpose (p. 217).

It is the continuing task of the executive to pour specific content into these general concepts. The proper content varies with the differing contexts of personality, over-all organizational purposes, and all the other elements which go to make up the total frame of reference in which the organization and its component parts operate. It is for these reasons that Barnard says,

This general executive process is not intellectual in its important aspect; it is aesthetic and moral. Thus its exercise involves the sense of fitness, of the appropriate, and that capacity which is known as responsibility—the final expression for the achievement of coöperation (p. 257).

³ Harvard University Press, 1938.

In other words, there is no handy formula which the executive may use in determining which specific responsibilities and functions to keep in his office,⁴ which to delegate, how to categorize them for distribution, how to establish lines of communication for use in controlling and knowing about the essential functioning of the delegated prerogatives, and so on. And as there is no formula, there is no *a priori* test of executive effectiveness. The only test is that of history: Does the organization produce results? Does it persist? Does it compel loyalty? So there is no one who can say that certain functions (which are the specific acts of applying authority to the loci of responsibility) should always and everywhere remain with the executive, and that certain functions should be delegated invariably to the so-called line agencies in the organization.

Is the executive faced, then, with the dilemma of having to proceed with no guideposts save his own moral and aesthetic judgment? Probably not entirely, though it is certain that what Barnard calls the moral factors of leadership cannot be classified dogmatically, taught successfully and completely, or elicited except from intuitive sources. These factors of judgment are rooted too deeply and too far back in a man's personal history to permit of revolutionary change or instantaneous production. Even granted these qualities, the executive still has to make the particular decisions concerning the distribution of prerogatives on more specific motives and standards than a blind reliance on his intuitive judgment; he must act on more than mere intuition. That is, an executive who is possessed of the moral qualifications of leadership dare not lull himself into thinking that whatever he decides in a pure stream-of-consciousness framework will automatically be the correct and successful decision. He must employ certain devices of thought, certain standards of judgment.

In coming to a decision on the fit and appropriate arrangement of authority and responsibility, the executive ordinarily tries, on

the one hand, to delegate all functions which can be identified as strictly operational. On the other hand, it should be recalled that the "functions of executives relate to all the work essential to the vitality and endurance of an organization." This means that the executive is interested in keeping the internal lines of communication open, durable, and active. That is to say, he is interested in promoting the organization's capacity for harmonious interchange of ideas; the ability of the organization to cope with difficulties; and organizational oneness—in the face, so to speak, of the divisive formal facts of separation of functions. Business and governmental organizations are akin to political parties in that there is in all of them an inherent tendency toward hardening of the organizational arteries, as Robert Michels has demonstrated in his little known, but highly perceptive book *Political Parties*.⁵ The executive strives at once to maintain the organization's integrity and its fluidity. To these functions has been given the name "coordination."

Thus it is demonstrable that the executive is justified, nay obligated, in retaining in his own office the critical prerogatives of coordination. And though every executive does a certain amount of nonexecutive work (such as delivering lectures to employees in training courses), he compromises his position to the extent that he retains operational functions in his office. This appears to be, on its face, an easy distinction. But it is in fact difficult, and its application in detail produces many problems of judgment. In concrete situations, how does the executive distinguish between coordinating and operating functions? Forms control and design, for example, is an operational function in the sense that it is routine, and directly produces concrete, measurable results. On the other hand, it is a coordination function in that it is an effective and flexible means of executive cognizance of methods and procedures. Numerous other functions could be discussed in about the same terms. But in general terms, the problem can be resolved in the light of some such criteria as these:

1. The executive should delegate all clearly operational functions to operating units.
2. In a case where the classification of a function as

⁴ In a certain sense, the total authority remains in his office, though its detailed application is largely made by others, everywhere in the organization—or perhaps it can better be said that his is the basic authority, from which segments can be separated without at the same time decreasing the size of the basic authority.

⁵ Hearst's International Library Co., 1915. 416 pp.

operational or coordinating is debatable, it should be considered operational.

3. Coordination functions should be as few and general as possible.

At this point it is possible to conclude, with Mr. Hogan, that the arguments against centralization of housekeeping services are strong. Granted that centralization of such activities probably is efficient in terms of cost per work unit, it is also true that these functions are not executive in nature, and therefore should not ordinarily be made part of the executive's staff. And to organize them in a separate staff unit, outside the operating line, is to invite the dangers of irresponsibility and megalomania. The extension of auxiliary functions of this kind should therefore be made only with extreme caution.

The application of these criteria reduces to a minimum the formal operations of the executive, permitting a corresponding expansion of his informal tools of coordination. The formal tools of coordination can probably be limited in government organizations to over-all budgeting, the coordination of planning activities, and administrative management (in the sense of methods analysis, etc.). These three general types of activity can be defined in terms of control, and equally, in terms of service. The control and service characteristics of coordination activities need not be discussed in any detail here, however.

In a small organization the executive is able to conduct these coordination activities himself—in effect, this same thing can be seen also in large organizations, in the supervisors of the smallest units. There is a physical and efficient limit on the quantity of coordination work which the executive can do. As an organization grows in size and complexity, the executive must either decrease the number and scope of his coordination activities, or he must place in his office a staff of experts to help him. Since the former alternative is not ordinarily feasible, the second is typically chosen perforce. The executive's staff, within the meaning of what has been said before, does not possess any delegated authority or responsibility. Rather, this staff is to be considered an extension of the executive's personality, simply performing functions which he would do himself if he had

the time. Herein resides another useful distinction between staff work and operational work.

The staff's relationship to the executive should be that of an agency furnishing to him both the raw material of, and possible conclusions with respect to, coordination activities. The executive is none the less the sole coordinator because his staff digs up the facts, studies the background, and suggests possible answers to the coordination problems. For the coordination staff (as here conceived) does not act directly upon the line organizations or directly upon the routine subject matter of the organizational whole. It is not correct, therefore, to speak of such a staff as an "external mechanism of coordination." It is certainly not external unless the same adjective is applicable to the executive. To call the executive external is to make a pointless observation, for, though he is in one physical sense external to the line agencies under him, their authority and responsibility are delegations from him, and the basic relationships existing between him and them forbid any theorizing about externality as such.

The requisite conditions for the successful functioning of an executive staff are well known: there must be full, free, and continuous interchange of ideas, information, and coordination data between executive and staff; the staff must be clearly a part of the executive's office, and not merely a coordinate and competing agency among the operating units; the staff must understand that its function is to serve the executive, and not to trade on his authority, in dealing directly with line agencies; the line agencies must be fully aware of the staff's nature and function; and so on.

Dangers inherent in the operation of a coordinating staff are likewise easy to recognize. The staff may consciously or unconsciously become involved in operational activities; it may wither because of neglect on the part of the executive; it may become merely a messenger service, destined to carry proposals from one department head to another because the executive erroneously believes that the coordination product should consist of neat sets of initials on policy proposals and that these initials of department heads are inevitably symptoms of harmony. There are other dangers as well.

But the basic conclusion is clear. The pri-

mary mission of the executive is to preserve and strengthen the integrity of the organization while at the same time promoting the activity of its internal lines of communication. The name for this mission is coordination. To deny the validity of this function is to deny the *raison d'être* of the executive. The executive requires help in the coordination of a large

organization. The coordinating staff supplies this help, and in content this help is both formal and informal. The coordinating staff as a mechanism of coordination is certainly not external, but integral; and far from being the first consolation of a desperate executive, it is the indispensable right hand of the efficient executive.

Manpower Control in the Air Transport Command

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IN 1941 the United States Army Air Forces had fewer than 100,000 military and civilian personnel. Its peak strength during the war was well over 2,500,000. Both its size and its rapid expansion made personnel management (recruitment, training, assignment, and control) one of the AAF's major management tasks.

Two distinct but closely related problems were basic to AAF personnel management: (1) the accurate determination of the numbers and qualifications of personnel required for current and future operations and (2) the recruitment, training, and assignment of individuals to meet these requirements. In its broadest aspects the first problem is called "manpower control"; the manpower control experience of one of the major AAF constituent units, the Air Transport Command, is the subject of this paper.

The Air Transport Command was created as the Ferrying Command before the entry of the United States into the war. Its original mission was to ferry lend lease aircraft from American factories to embarkation points where they were taken over by the British. This original mission was rapidly expanded as United States military operations grew until the ATC was (1) ferrying aircraft to all Allied-controlled areas, (2) transporting Allied personnel and supplies within the United States and to and from Allied countries and fighting fronts, (3) returning American sick and wounded from the fighting areas to base hospitals and to the United States, and (4) training transport and ferry pilots and other flight and aircraft maintenance personnel.

To accomplish these varied missions, ATC's organization structure gradually evolved into a command headquarters in Washington, divi-

sion headquarters in each of the major world areas in which ATC operated, and operating bases and units throughout the world. Flexibility of organization and operation was essential since every change in AAF strategy and planning placed new demands upon the ATC.

Tables of Organization

UNTIL 1943 manpower control in ATC was based on the traditional Army tables of organization system. In this system, the War Department established a table of organization for each standard type Army unit. These T/Os gave the authorized officer and enlisted strength for the unit by grade and occupational qualification. They also authorized the unit's major items of equipment. Within the United States T/Os for fixed installations were supplemented by authorizations of civilian positions, primarily for base maintenance. Military personnel were assigned in accordance with T/O vacancies, and promotions were governed by authorized grade vacancies. Classification and promotion of civilian employees were in accordance with Civil Service Commission rules and procedures.

The T/O system was designed to provide an Army of mobile, self-sufficient tactical and supply units whose exact mission and work load were not known in advance. These units could readily be combined as the situation required since they had known standard capabilities. The basic ATC T/O unit was a ferrying squadron. Squadrons were combined to make ferrying groups with a T/O for the group headquarters. Thus an ATC base was organized and staffed by the assignment of a ferrying group and one or more ferrying squadrons. Normally,

the base also had a supplemental authorization of civilian employees.

By 1943, however, it had become apparent that the T/O system did not provide an adequate basis for organizing and staffing ATC bases or, for that matter, any fixed AAF base in the continental United States. The primary difficulty was that the T/O system was too standardized and inflexible to meet the needs of installations with varying missions and changing work loads. Or to phrase it another way, the standardization which gave flexibility to tactical units resulted in rigidity for fixed bases. The reasons for this rigidity were twofold: (1) A ferrying squadron, consisting of several hundred personnel, was too large a unit to be readily reassigned to meet changes in work load, and (2) the T/O for a ferrying squadron could not be varied to reflect variations in the availability of trained civilian employees. For example, a training organization quartered in a large hotel and messed on a contract basis did not require the mess personnel authorized by its T/O. A new T/O could not be created for this unit, however, since it did not represent a standard organization used at several locations.

Manning Tables and Base Units

THE AAF, therefore, discarded the T/O system for bases within the United States and for ATC bases all over the world. In its place was developed the base unit system for organizing bases and the manning table system for staffing them. A single ATC base unit was created at each base instead of assigning a ferrying group and a number of ferrying squadrons to it. All ATC base units had the same general organization structure—four operating functions (aircraft operations and maintenance, supply and services, priorities and traffic, and personnel and administrative services), six staff functions (air inspector, surgeon, flying safety, organizational planning, statistical control, and budget and fiscal), and as many administrative sections as required to quarter enlisted personnel and maintain their personal records. A separate manning table was prepared for each base unit showing the required qualifications and grades of military personnel and qualifications of civilian personnel by function and major subfunction. Upon approval of ATC base unit M/Ts by headquarters, AAF, the ATC was al-

lotted bulk authorizations of military personnel grades and qualifications and a total number of civilian personnel positions. These bulk authorizations were in turn suballotted to ATC division headquarters and then to their base units to serve as the basis for the assignment and promotion of military personnel and recruitment of civilian personnel.

The flexibility of the M/T system, as contrasted with the T/O system, lay in (1) the determination of the exact personnel requirements for each base unit, (2) the inclusion of both military and civilian personnel in the same authorization system, (3) the establishment of bulk authorizations for each level of command, and (4) delegation of authority to ATC division headquarters to adjust the base unit authorizations within the division authorizations. Periodically, headquarters AAF required the submission of a new M/T for each base unit as a basis for revising ATC's bulk authorizations. ATC could request a change in its authorizations whenever there were major changes in its work loads. It was essential that the authorizations to each base unit be kept accurate and up-to-date since the consolidated authorizations provided the basis for personnel planning, assignment, and training by headquarters AAF and the War Department.

Manpower Control Units

WITH the conversion from the T/O to the M/T system, ATC was faced with the problems of organizing and staffing its new manpower control activities. The military personnel authorizations had changed so little, and had deviated so far from actual requirements, under the T/O procedures that personnel requirements had in effect been determined by the personnel section in making assignments. Initially, therefore, manpower control units were established in the command, division, and base unit personnel sections.

It soon became apparent that if personnel were to be efficiently and economically utilized, the commanding officer at each echelon must take a personal interest in manpower control. The personnel officer as the head of one of the major operating functions of each echelon was not in a position to give his commanding officer entirely impartial and objective advice on such a controversial subject. An organizational plan-

ning office was, therefore, created as a part of the command section at each echelon with responsibility for developing and recommending plans, policies, and procedures with respect to all organization matters and with respect to the most efficient and economical use of manpower. The manpower control units were then transferred from the personnel sections to the organizational planning offices. Thus was established a clear division between the responsibility for determination of personnel requirements and establishment of personnel authorizations and the responsibility for recruitment and assignment of personnel.

Most ATC personnel officers, particularly at the command and division levels, were never reconciled to the loss of manpower control activities and continually carried on campaigns to regain responsibility for them. Their main argument was that the close coordination required between determination of personnel requirements, establishment of personnel authorizations, and recruitment, classification, and assignment of personnel necessitated the assignment of all these responsibilities to the personnel section. The writer's conclusion after experience with manpower control work in both the personnel and organizational planning sections is that the many responsibilities of the personnel section operate to impair seriously the effectiveness of any manpower control activities it carries on.

The staffing of the manpower control units proved to be extremely difficult. Although the records of all officer and enlisted personnel assigned to several ATC divisions were screened, few trained budget or management personnel were discovered. Attempts to obtain those personnel with pertinent backgrounds usually disclosed that they already occupied key positions and thus were not available. Most manpower control positions were filled by training the most promising personnel available, but in this process a high percentage had to be reassigned to other work after a trial period. This training program took much of the time of the few experienced personnel and seriously interfered with their primary work.

Manpower Control Problems

THREE basic problems faced the newly created manpower control units. They were:

1. *Accurate Determination of Manpower Requirements.* Most operating and staff officers were sincerely convinced that they alone knew the manpower requirements for their particular specialty. The officers of a base unit felt the local peculiarities of their base required primary consideration while the staff officers in division and command headquarters believed their opinions should override the desires of the base unit. Few of these officers were concerned with the economical use of manpower so long as the work loads were accomplished. Usually, the manpower control staff was alone in struggling to meet the dual criteria of adequate but minimum personnel.

2. *Coordination of Operating Plans and Personnel Authorizations.* Operational plans were made by pilots and other operations specialists who for the most part had little appreciation of manpower control or personnel problems. They were strongly imbued with the wartime Army attitude that the "warm bodies" to do the job could somehow be obtained. In addition, speed was essential in making operating plans. Therefore, commitments to perform new or increased work loads were usually made without consideration of the manpower authorization or personnel required to carry out the plans. This lack of coordination occurred at all levels from headquarters AAF down to the base units. But the ATC divisions and base units were the ones to suffer most since they were the echelons that were actually required to perform such work loads as ferrying aircraft, operating transports, and evacuating wounded by air.

3. *Thorough and Speedy Review and Approval of Manpower Requirements.* It took headquarters ATC and headquarters AAF more than three months to review and approve the first set of M/Ts for ATC base units. By the time the M/Ts were approved, the requirements of most of the base units had changed and the bulk authorizations allotted by headquarters AAF no longer met ATC needs. A great deal of work went into developing procedures which would provide the base units with personnel authorizations which reflected their needs in the immediate future.

It is apparent that in a more general form these same basic problems are faced by every civilian administrator and his budget officer. A

civilian government agency is confronted with them not only in regard to personnel but also with respect to supplies, equipment, contractual services, and the other administrative expenditures. The writer believes that the techniques developed by ATC in dealing with these problems can be easily modified to apply to civilian government budget procedures. The following discussion, therefore, occasionally digresses to point out these possible adaptations.

Determination of Manpower Requirements

IN THE Air Transport Command's experience there were two criteria which a sound system for determining manpower requirements must meet. First, the manpower requirements established for the base unit had to be adequate for the satisfactory accomplishment of its missions but not excessive. The manpower control units were always caught between the demands of higher headquarters for economy and the demands of operating officials for more personnel and higher grades. The responsibility was great since too few personnel impaired the performance of a portion of the war effort and too many personnel needlessly denied scarce manpower to other war activities. A majority of the base unit commanding officers were "empire builders" consciously or unconsciously, owing in part to the Army practice of promoting commanding officers on such factors as physical appearance of their base, smartness of the military reviews, splendor of the officers' club, and number of personnel assigned their base. In other words, the bigger and more splendid the "empire" the higher the rank of its commanding officer. A promotion policy based on the efficiency of commanding officers in accomplishing essential war activities with a minimum of personnel would have been more effective in saving personnel than almost any device that was used.

Second, the personnel requirements for performing similar work loads had to be as uniform as possible, but at the same time had adequately to recognize local situations which required deviations from the standard requirements. Not only the numbers of personnel but also the military grades and occupational specialties should be the same for the performance of equal work loads. The civil service principle of equal pay for equal work was just as valid

when applied to military personnel. On the other hand, the personnel requirements had to reflect local variations such as differences in the efficiency of working space, weather extremes, and, to some extent, quality of available personnel. With base units scattered over a wide geographical area these local differences were important factors which had to be recognized.

To meet these two M/T criteria, ATC manpower control units utilized several techniques. Division manpower control units used at one time or another at least four different methods of preparing base unit M/Ts. Personnel requirements were developed (1) by the staff sections of division headquarters, (2) by the base units, (3) by the division manpower control unit, or (4) through manpower surveys of the base units. It was found that the requirements prepared by any one of these methods failed to meet fully both of the controlling criteria. Therefore, a procedure utilizing all four of these methods was developed by extensive trial and error.

The first step in this procedure was the preparation of an operating and work load forecast for the next three months for the base unit concerned. The division headquarters staff sections participated in the preparation of the plan and forecast. They also briefed the manpower survey team members on their portion of the operating plan and on the number of personnel required to perform the anticipated work loads. Applying a statistical forecast technique (which is described later) to the projected work loads, the manpower control unit established target personnel requirements for the four major base unit functions—aircraft operations and maintenance, supply and services, priorities and traffic, and personnel and administrative services. These target figures were given the manpower survey team as guides.

The second step was a five-to-ten-day survey of the base unit's personnel requirements by the division team of two to four members. After a general discussion with the commanding officer, a member of the team reviewed the projected work loads with the officer in charge of each activity and obtained his estimate of the personnel required. The officer had to justify his estimate in considerable detail and to furnish information on the present utilization of personnel. After checking his estimate against

the standards and guides, the survey team sought to reach an agreement on his future requirements with the officer in charge of each activity. The requirements for his activities were next discussed with the officer in charge of each major base function and then with the base unit commanding officer. If possible, an agreement was reached. The team recommended consolidation or elimination of functions, improvement of operating procedures, or changes in facilities and equipment when savings in manpower or increased operating efficiency would result. The commanding officer was requested to furnish the team with a written statement either concurring in the recommended requirements or stating his objections.

As the third step, the team's findings and recommendations were reviewed by the division manpower control unit. Where they involved action by division headquarters or when the base unit commanding officer did not concur, they were coordinated with the division staff section concerned.

The final step was the adjustment of the base unit's personnel authorizations to carry out the survey team's recommendations. The new M/T for the base unit was then sent to the personnel section for necessary action in assigning or transferring personnel and to other division staff sections for their information and comments. To avoid delay, the new personnel requirements were not sent to the division staff sections until they were put into effect (except for coordination on controversial items). Prompt action was found to be essential to convince commanding officers of the importance of the team's recommendations and to emphasize to division staff sections the responsibility of the commanding officer for operation of his base within the agreed requirements. Often division officers wanted to increase the team recommendations. Their objections were debated after the changes in the base's authorizations were put into effect; any revisions which were agreed to be necessary were subsequently made.

Even with the most careful briefing and training of manpower survey teams, the human factor always caused variations in their recommendations beyond those justified by differences in base units. To minimize unjustified variations, standards were developed for use by the teams. The first standards (or "yardsticks")

used in the Army were developed by the War Department Manpower Board for its survey teams. They were a simple relationship between the number of personnel and the activities' major work load, e.g., for link trainer operation five personnel were allowed for one trainer, six for two trainers, seven for three trainers, etc. Obviously, this type of yardstick omits many factors which must be considered in arriving at the requirements in a concrete situation. The base units particularly objected to their use on the ground that they did not take into consideration local peculiarities. The value of such simplified standards is questionable because of the danger of misuse in the hands of the unskilled.

At least one ATC division developed another type of standard which proved extremely useful. These "manpower planning factors" recognized that the accurate determination of manpower requirements is a difficult problem. They, therefore, set forth all the major factors which the survey team had to take into account, omitting only those purely local considerations like space layout. In contrast to the WDMB yardstick for link trainer operation, the manpower planning factor involved precise definitions of the length of a shift and the percentage of operating time to scheduled link time and then went into detailed allowances for days off, furlough, and sickness. It included an example in which the link operators, supervisors, and mechanics required by a base unit were calculated in nine steps. The planning factor for computing aircraft maintenance requirements was more than thirty pages in length and included both work sheets for use in applying the factors and line graphs for simplified approximate computations.

Manpower planning factors, therefore, were a summary of the experience accumulated in determining the requirements for many base units. They were developed over a period of time and were subject to constant revision. Before being used they were reviewed by the base units themselves.

Comparative analysis was another valuable technique when properly used by trained personnel. Comparisons based on the average or mean were generally of little value and often misleading. On the other hand, comparisons based on the personnel required by an activity

of known efficiency were of great value in preparing and reviewing manpower requirements for similar activities. This was amply demonstrated when by using this technique two representatives from headquarters ATC with a small clerical staff prepared M/Ts for an entire division in less than a month's time. Estimated personnel requirements involving more than 30,000 positions were submitted by over 20 base units. The analysts also visited representative bases for first-hand information. The base unit estimates were then analyzed and M/Ts prepared which represented drastic reductions for some bases and increases for others. Subsequent experience confirmed that in aggregate these M/Ts represented the division's needs, although refinements and adjustments between base units were required when they were put into effect. Recalculation of this division's requirements a few months later by manpower survey teams resulted in more accurate individual M/Ts but required four months and a staff three times as large.

For greatest accuracy and effectiveness, determinations of manpower requirements should be based on and backed by standard operating procedures. The most common question thrown at a survey team member recommending a reduction in personnel was whether he had ever run the activity concerned. When his answer was "no," his recommendations were immediately discredited by implication if not directly. Actually, many supervisors were entirely sincere when they said that a specified number of personnel was the minimum with which they could satisfactorily perform the work load. Yet, their minimum was often excessive as a result of inefficient procedures in use. In such circumstances, a reduction in personnel without an accompanying improvement in work methods resulted only in unsatisfactory performance.

The goal in several ATC divisions was to determine and set forth efficient procedures for the performance of each major operation performed by the base units. Determinations of manpower requirements would then be based on these procedures with due consideration for local problems. Supervisors utilizing excessive personnel would be given sufficient time to adopt the recommended procedures or devise equally efficient ones before their personnel

were reduced. In this manner, division headquarters would constructively assist the base units in fulfilling their dual responsibility of satisfactory performance and minimum personnel.

Unfortunately, procedures studies were almost entirely neglected in the ATC. They were always sidetracked in the rush of turning out the new M/Ts required by changes in work load. Between V-E Day and V-J Day increasing attention was focused on the procedures phase of manpower control but before a serious start was made the war ended and all efforts were devoted to demobilization.

In the first few months after the transition from T/Os to M/Ts headquarters AAF and ATC paid little attention to manpower requirements in planning new missions to be assigned to ATC. After the missions were undertaken, ATC would request the additional personnel authorizations required by the increased work loads. This delay was unsatisfactory to everyone concerned, so more and more emphasis was placed on including manpower requirements in the advance planning so that the allotment of the additional authorizations could accompany the assignment of the new mission. This required development of techniques for rapid calculation of requirements on the basis of an assumed set of work loads and operating conditions. In most instances each ATC division estimated the requirements for its part of the contemplated project with headquarters ATC consolidating them into the command plan.

The divisions found through experience that the general work load and operating assumptions could be translated into detailed personnel requirements by first estimating the detailed work loads required in carrying out the project. Using these work load estimates, an experienced manpower staff member could project the manpower requirements for each base unit activity involved. Such projections were usually remarkably accurate in total, although many adjustments in the requirements for individual activities were needed when the project was actually undertaken.

As a short cut in preparing these projections, the North African Division developed a statistical forecast technique which was found to be accurate for total requirements and could be

applied by less skilled personnel. One major work load item was selected for each major base unit function, i.e., flight operations, aircraft maintenance, priorities and traffic, supply and service, and personnel and administrative services. An experience ratio of required personnel to the major work load item was worked out for each major activity. The estimated future work loads were translated into personnel requirements by application of these ratios. The use of these ratios was particularly effective in the North African Division during the demobilization period when work loads and personnel requirements were changing rapidly.

The basic problems with which ATC struggled also confront civilian government officials when they determine their personnel requirements and needs for other categories of expenditures. The techniques used by ATC are equally valid for meeting these civilian needs and can be used by many local, state, and federal agencies. A state employment service, for example, might well use the ATC survey procedures on a broader scale to cover all the management activities of the local employment offices. Federal agency budget officers need more first-hand knowledge of their field office requirements. Obtaining this knowledge can be combined with constructive assistance to central and field operating officials through use of the survey technique. Or, as another example, the statistical forecast technique is readily adapted to projecting funds required for an expansion or contraction of an operating program.

Coordination of Plans and Authorizations

THE first essential in obtaining coordination of operating plans and manpower authorizations was active support from the commanding officers at all echelons. This support came only as a result of bitter experiences when the base unit and division commanding officers found themselves expected to perform new missions or increased work loads without increased personnel authorizations. Often an excess of "warm bodies" above authorized strength enabled a base unit to undertake additional work without an increase in military personnel. In such cases, however, failure to obtain promptly the justified increase in authorization caused morale problems by blocking promotions. It

also created the danger that necessary personnel might be transferred from the base at any time as being in excess of authorized strength.

Even after the commanding officers became aware of the need for greater coordination between operational and manpower requirement planning, techniques for ensuring this coordination were required. The most successful technique developed was the program book. A program book brought together in one place the facilities, major items of equipment, and personnel requirements needed to perform current and projected work loads. It set forth by quarters for the coming year the official operating plans and requirements for each base unit to serve as a basis for planning and action by all echelons. A revised program book was prepared each quarter for the ensuing year, but owing to the rapidity of changes, it was essential that the manpower control units keep the projected personnel requirements up to date for every change in operating plans. At least one division followed the procedure of informing ATC of such interim changes by letter amendments to its latest program book.

Early in 1944, headquarters AAF required all continental Air Forces and Commands to prepare their first program books. ATC delayed the preparation of its first book until the Fall of 1944 when each division prepared its own. These were consolidated by headquarters ATC to form the command program book. Unfortunately, the large amount of work involved in the preparation of these books led ATC to abandon them in the Spring of 1945 when they were beginning to achieve marked success as a coordinating device.

Even during the period in which program books were being prepared, it was necessary to make frequent special estimates of personnel requirements for new projects under discussion in higher headquarters. The War Department and headquarters AAF needed to know the personnel required to perform major missions, such as the inauguration of new transport routes, before deciding that the missions were to be performed. After the abandonment of the program books, these special estimates became the major coordinating device in advance planning. Headquarters ATC would inform the divisions in general what was expected of them under a proposed project. Each division would

then prepare a detailed plan including the additional bases and other facilities, major equipment, and personnel required. Inclusion in a single plan of the operational and personnel requirements achieved the desired coordination. The Green Project in which tens of thousands of troops were returned to the United States from Europe and the Mediterranean Area by air after V-E Day is a major example of this type of planning.

In civilian government it often happens that plans for new work are well developed and even put into effect before the financial and personnel requirements are considered. Congressional Appropriations Committees have frequently complained that federal agencies submit requests for supplemental appropriations to cover deficits incurred in undertaking new or increased work. More frequently agency budget officers must make major readjustments in their allocations of funds because some operating official has undertaken a new project without advance planning and coordination. Civilian administrators could achieve at least partial coordination of their operational and budgetary planning through the use of a modified version of the ATC program book technique.

Authorization Review Procedures

EVEN the most accurate M/Ts soon lost their value unless they were approved promptly and kept current. With the rapidly changing wartime work loads, the requirements for a base unit of 2,500 to 5,000 personnel never remained exactly the same from month to month. Even if no major changes in work load occurred, the minor changes over a three-month period made a M/T out of date.

Several of the ATC procedures already described contributed to keeping the base unit authorizations up to date. Prompt review and approval of manpower survey team recommendations by division headquarters and immediate adjustment of the base unit's authorization was an essential procedure. The program books also contributed by providing headquarters AAF with estimates of future requirements and providing a basis for periodic adjustments of ATC's authorizations. The inclusion of manpower requirements in the planning of new

missions resulted in the additional personnel authorizations being issued to ATC when the new missions were assigned. These steps all helped.

Another important element was a smoothly functioning manpower control unit at each large base unit and in division headquarters. If the changes in requirements were promptly recognized by the base unit and acted upon by division headquarters many of the minor adjustments could be made from day to day within the division's bulk authorizations. Decentralization of authority to the division headquarters to change their occupational specialty authorizations with postaudit by headquarters ATC speeded up control procedures immeasurably. Another device found essential was the creation of small reserves of authorization at division headquarters to permit immediate authorization increases to base units when required. At the end of the war an experiment was in progress of allowing a division to draw within specified limitations upon the ATC reserve without prior approval, in lieu of maintaining its own reserve.

Two other techniques used in the ATC deserve more extensive discussion. One of the major causes of the long delay in obtaining ATC and AAF approval of the first M/Ts was their disagreement with the work loads on which the M/Ts were based. To eliminate this cause of delay the procedure was followed of working out an agreement on the projected major work loads before the M/Ts were prepared. To do this, headquarters AAF or the War Department laid down the general operating plan for three to six months in advance. The operating plan was in terms of aircraft to be ferried by source and destination, tons of cargo to be flown, number of wounded to be transported, etc. Next, headquarters ATC amplified this general plan by estimating the number of aircraft required, schedules to be flown, etc. Each division then prepared detailed plans for each base unit's share of the division work load. Often the divisions or headquarters ATC would present objections to the general plans as given them based on their more detailed knowledge of operating problems. These objections were considered by the higher headquarters and an agreement reached. The final plans and work loads provided the basis for preparing M/Ts.

Disagreements as to the number of personnel required for the performance of estimated work loads were a related cause for delay in approval of the first ATC M/Ts. Days were lost, for example, in debating in headquarters ATC the number of pilots required to ferry the estimated number of aircraft to be moved. Here, again, the elimination of delay was achieved by advance agreement on the standards to be used in translating work loads into personnel requirements. These agreements were reached by (1) the divisions forwarding their manpower planning factors to headquarters ATC for approval as they were developed and (2) headquarters ATC forwarding its standards to the divisions for comment before they were adopted. Once the standards were agreed upon the review of M/Ts centered around deviations from the standards owing to special situations or local base unit problems.

These two techniques can be widely used to speed up the budget review process in civilian government. For the past several years, the Federal Bureau of the Budget has reached advance agreement with the various agencies operating federal hospitals on the estimated patient loads on which the hospital budgets are based. This eliminates the work and delay involved in re-doing the budgets if the Budget Bureau disagrees with the agencies' estimates of patient loads. Many other budgets are based primarily on one or more major work loads, e.g., prison budgets on estimated prison population, disbursing unit budgets on number of checks to be written. Advance agreements between the

budget agency and operating agency on all such work loads are practical and desirable.

An equally wide field exists for advance agreements on the factors to be used in converting work loads into personnel or money requirements. For example, an agreement could be reached on the number of checks which can be written per person or the cost per ration in feeding prisoners. Use of agreed work loads and conversion factors in the initial preparation of budgets should simplify their review, eliminate much of the work of revising budgets, and permit shortening the time allotted for budget processing.

In evaluating ATC's wartime manpower control program, it can be credited with (1) adoption of the manning table system, a distinct improvement over the traditional army tables of organization, and (2) the steady improvement in the control procedures over a two-year period. On the debit side were (1) the cumbersomeness and slowness of the control procedures in spite of the great improvements and (2) the failure of the personnel sections in headquarters, AAF and ATC to utilize the personnel requirements as determined by the manpower control system. Surplus military personnel remained at ATC base units long after they were determined to be excess and requirements for additional personnel remained unfilled long after their need became critical. The net result of the wartime innovations, however, was a distinct improvement in the efficiency and accuracy of the manpower control system.

Humanizing Public Administration

By C. SPENCER PLATT

U. S. Bureau of the Budget

IN THESE times of transition toward consolidating the peace at home and abroad, public administrators are more than ever seeking ways to make the efforts of their organizations entirely productive. Much depends on the effectiveness with which the activity of people can be organized and managed for public purposes. Two aspects may be suggested: the organization of activity within public agencies, and the organization of relationships between the people comprising the agency and the public whom they serve. This discussion concerns internal agency organization and management.

To an unspecialized observer of systematized public agency management, a surprising amount of technical specialism has developed in such fields as position classification, salary administration, placement, organization structure, procedure analysis, and the like. A principal question is why in their efforts to achieve satisfactory working arrangements those responsible for the present condition of the "science, processes, and art of public administration" have paid so little attention to the systematic development of methods and skills of human relations. Public agencies are composed of people no less than business and industrial organizations, yet industry has taken the lead in finding ways to release and mobilize human energies in large organizations in order to achieve greater productivity and greater satisfaction for organization members. Can managers of government agencies meet this challenge of industrial management in developing better ways to make relationships among people on the job more productive?

Many current discussions of industrial and labor relations reflect the advances made in the past few years in the understanding of relationships among people in many different circumstances, particularly among people at work.¹

Speculation as to why men work, what they want to get out of their daily work life, raises such questions as: What are the desires of the manager and the worker? Do they want merely the periodic pay envelope or check? Or is there something more that keeps groups of people functioning successfully together? Is there something more useful than the state of exhilaration—sometimes mistaken for morale—that follows "pep talk" methods? Why do some organization units work effectively and cooperatively over sustained periods, while others fall apart? Progressing from early pure speculation, consideration of these motivations and interrelationships has become systematic and experimental until today some reliable and useful understandings are being developed about the relationships among people at work.

Why Have Managers Become Interested?

MANAGERS have become interested in relationships among people, and their needs, desires, and reactions, because they have seen that mechanical, technological, and procedural improvements in ways of doing business have often failed to produce desired results. The reasons have often been such matters as inability of people to function effectively as team members, failure of people to achieve adequate understanding among themselves, and failure of people to find personal satisfaction in their jobs. Managers have also become interested because these human problems have been highlighted by union-management negotiations. Seeking the real causes underlying grievances of various sorts, shop stewards and managers have found

articles by Peter F. Drucker, "The Way to Industrial Peace," *Harper's Magazine*, November and December, 1946, and January, 1947. Schuyler Dean Hoslett, ed., *Human Factors in Management* (Park College Press, 1946), 322 pp., is a useful collection of recent articles of a less popular nature.

¹One meaningful popular discussion is a series of

that complaints about such matters as pay rates, cafeteria facilities, lighting, noise, and fatiguing working conditions often must be regarded as overt symptoms only. Real causes are to be found in the reasons why a worker or a group of workers begin to feel uncertain, frustrated, insecure in their jobs; why they think management doesn't understand their problems.

To manage is to mobilize resources and utilize them for accomplishing a purpose. The human resources of an organization are potentially of great value. This potential can be realized when the energies, initiative, ideas, and vigilance of the organization members are fully released and continuously and spontaneously focused on accomplishing the organization's purpose. To mobilize and utilize resources the manager must get other people—subordinates, associates, even superiors—to take effective action. All managers have potential human relations problems. Many managers have experienced increased operating effectiveness when friction among people is prevented, or, failing prevention, eliminated.

Both public and private managers are concerned with the unresponsiveness of large aggregations of people.² Big organizations tend to become rigid and inflexible. Standard rules and procedures seem essential to assure orderly functioning, yet they often fail to meet the requirements of local differences. And local discretion can be entrusted only to understanding and "sensible" people, that is, people who will find good ways to adhere closely to general policy in meeting local requirements. Coordination of effort often fails between people who rarely, perhaps never, see each other, and maladjustments persist unless differing attitudes can be reconciled. It is difficult for a member of a large organization to feel confidence in an over-all purpose he does not really understand and to which his own work seems unrelated. Nor can he feel secure in leaders he rarely sees and whose influence comes to him diluted through many levels of hierarchy. Feeling little sense of accomplishment and success, he has no surge of self-confidence to carry him along. Thus it is easy for morale to be low in bureaucracies, public or private.

² Marshall E. Dimock and Howard K. Hyde, *Bureaucracy and Trusteeship in Large Corporations*, TNEC Monograph No. 11 (Government Printing Office, 1940), 144 pp.

Yet large organizations can be made responsive. Members can achieve flexibility, coordinated effort, and high morale. Ways can be found to get members to assume responsibility, exercise initiative, and participate in formulating plans affecting their own future action. The rigidities of bigness can be relaxed to meet local conditions through people with proper attitudes and understandings.

How to achieve desired goals through the actions of other people is a main concern of both industrial and public managers. They are interested in better human relations management because they have seen that it can contribute to organization effectiveness.

Need for a Method and "Skill" of Human Relations

THE "welfare" approach to good human relations is often excellent and fills a real need, but its limitations have been demonstrated. No quantity of off-the-job contacts among people—picnics, dances, athletics, and the like—can take the place of rewarding on-the-job contacts. Nor can they overcome the effects of unrewarding on-the-job contacts.

Habitual, day-by-day effectiveness in managing human relationships presupposes the development of some useful methods for sizing up a given group of people and for working out solutions to emerging problems. With some systematization, successful methods can be developed and passed on from one manager to another. Managers can approach operating problems with greater assurance that they can solve their human relations aspects. Personalities, like fingerprints, do not duplicate one another. But social researchers encourage us to believe there are general principles about human interaction patterns; indeed, very important ones have already been well tested.

The really penetrating insights brought to bear by managers on human relations problems rarely result from supervisory training in generalizations. Sometimes they are the result of astonishing intuitions. More often, they are the result of painstaking effort to understand why particular groups react as they do under given conditions. Ways need to be found for people of average competence to be trained in understanding human relations and given experience suitable for developing them as managers of

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human activity. Methods must be systematized and skills developed in which managers can become proficient. The results of the social research and developmental work thus far conducted in industry give promise that this is no idle hope, but is well started on the way to becoming a reality.

Some Well-Known Experiments

THERE have been many successful experiments in the development of better human relations in industry, and to single out a few is to ignore others less well known but nevertheless of great value. Those selected have been described in publications that are generally available.

The pioneer effort is well known (though not always understood)—the Western Electric Hawthorne Plant researches, a collaborative effort by that company and the Harvard Business School Industrial Research Staff, which were completed in the late thirties.³ Here managers obtained results through systematic experimentation. Among other things, these experiments demonstrated that workers respond productively when they feel that management considers their welfare to be important. Although they did not show that financial rewards are unimportant, they did indicate that financial rewards must be supplemented. For the first time there was analyzed the spontaneous system of personal relationships which creates an informal unplanned organization, existing side by side with the formal organization structure planned by managers. These informal personal relationships in an organization can make or break the organization, depending on how well they are understood by management and how successfully management decisions take them into account. Here was evidence that human relationships are inevitable and can not be "got-ten rid of." They are just as real a factor in operations as are machines and finances. The in-

formal social organization of the factory should be understood, not fought.

Also in the late thirties, another important, though perhaps less well known research was carried on in another manufacturing concern, in collaboration with the Industrial Relations Section of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.⁴ An analysis was made of the frequency of contacts among the organization members. Study of the interactions taking place among the various members of the organization showed that breakdown in morale could be explained in terms of some crucial changes in interpersonal relationships which were not planned in the formal organization. When some unrecognized and undesirable relationships among the organization members were brought to light it was then possible to rearrange the formal relationships more realistically. In this experiment the interaction patterns previously studied mainly in the clinic were studied in the factory and used successfully to guide managerial action.

In more recent years, collaboration between the Committee on Human Relations in Industry of the University of Chicago and a number of neighboring business and industrial concerns has resulted in significant research findings relating to more effective management of human relations.⁵ This research, too, has highlighted the importance of, and given new meaning to teamwork, communication, personal satisfaction, and the usefulness of information concerning the direction, frequency, etc., of the interactions among selected individuals and groups within the industrial organization.

More difficult to report are the innumerable individual company experiments and researches which seem to be going on all over the country conducted by factory human relations

³ C. M. Arensberg and Douglas McGregor, "Determination of Morale in an Industrial Company," *1 Applied Anthropology* 12-14 (1942).

⁴ The first in a series of publications is William F. Whyte, ed., *Industry and Society* (McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1946), 211 pp. Another to be published shortly is William F. Whyte, *Human Problems in the Restaurant Industry*. See also Burleigh B. Gardner and William Foote Whyte, "The Man in the Middle: Position and Problems of the Foreman," *4 Applied Anthropology* 1-28 (1945); and Andrew H. Whiteford, William Foote Whyte, and Burleigh B. Gardner, "From Conflict to Cooperation," *5 Applied Anthropology* 1-31 (1946).

⁵ Several publications describe the Hawthorne researches. Some of the better known are: Elton Mayo, *The Human Problems of an Industrial Civilization* (Graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard University, 1933), 194 pp.; F. J. Roethlisberger and William J. Dickson, *Management and the Worker* (Harvard University Press, 1939), 615 pp.; T. N. Whitehead, *The Industrial Worker; A Statistical Study of Human Relations in a Group of Manual Workers* (Harvard University Press, 1938), 2 vols.

staffs, variously designated as industrial relations, personnel management, or other similar units. For example, the value of a democratic, participative form of management was demonstrated in a textile concern.⁶

An experience in a related field, having value to practical administrators, was the community management program of the U. S. War Relocation Authority. The results of the work done in the Poston, Arizona, Relocation Center have been systematically appraised both for their usefulness to the Relocation Center and in the light of requirements for administering occupied territory.⁷ This appraisal of the actions of individuals and organizations under stress and the accompanying recommendations have relevance and ready adaptability to the needs of many public agency managers.

Ascertaining Local Human Relations Conditions

SUCCESSFUL efforts to improve the management of human activity and relationships have achieved effectiveness in large measure because they have emphasized that the manager must act according to the specific human facts of the local situation. This contrasts with some well-intentioned but often ineffective attempts to follow generalizations about good human relations management. To be sure, there are some tested generalizations, but these only guide the manager as he grapples with the particular conditions of his organization. Conflicts, frictions, stresses, tensions, do not arise in general; they develop out of concrete human conditions and must be dealt with in terms of those conditions. In seeking to improve the human relationships of his organization, the first major problem of the manager is to know what the present relationships are and what they mean.

How can the manager know and understand the facts about the concrete human relations situation in his own organization? How can he foresee emerging conflicts and remove the causes? How can he know the causes of present conflicts and dissatisfactions, in order to resolve

them? Many approaches to understanding human relations at work have been worked out. A fourfold classification may be helpful at this point: (1) individual, (2) environmental, (3) cooperative, and (4) situational. Early in its development, personnel work concentrated exclusively on individual and environmental factors. Increasingly in the past few years, the cooperative and situational factors have been recognized.

Individual. Early efforts to increase the effectiveness of organized human activity centered on the individual worker—his abilities, wants, and reactions. Tests of skills and abilities, analyses of job requirements, transferability of skills, performance measures and analysis, attitude measures, fatigue factors—these have typified the individual approach. The conditions disclosed here led to such correctional measures as employee counseling, individual placement, skill training for employees, incentive pay plans, and supervisory training emphasizing "treating employees as individuals." The industrial psychologist, the industrial psychiatrist, and the industrial engineer have borne the main burden of the work done under this approach. It is an important and useful approach, but it needs to be supplemented.

Environmental. Environmental factors affecting people have also engaged the attention of those concerned with understanding the human situation. Lighting, posture chairs, modern washroom facilities, noise reduction, cafeteria and recreation facilities, accident prevention—these have all come in for their share of attention, with consequent improvement in many cases of work performance and satisfaction. The industrial psychologist, the industrial engineer, and the personnel worker have been mainly responsible for the advances made in the environmental field.

Cooperative. Beginning perhaps with the publication of the results of the Western Electric Hawthorne Plant experiments, the nature of interpersonal and group relationships have been regarded as important. More recently, numerous training efforts, the analysis of military morale, and the analysis of war production factory work teams, for example, have confirmed the Hawthorne findings and have revealed some specific factors building or breaking teamwork and cooperation. Emphasis is

⁶ John R. P. French, Jr., Arthur Kornhauser, and Alfred Marrow, "Conflict and Cooperation," *Journal of Social Issues* 29-34 (1946).

⁷ Alexander H. Leighton, *The Governing of Men* (Princeton University Press, 1945), 404 pp.

placed on factors influencing the cooperation of team members, among the most important of which is the group leadership which creates teamwork. Appraisal of interpersonal relationships in the work group is basic to this approach, which also includes understanding various types of leadership and leadership training methods. Current emphasis seems to be placed chiefly on democratic participative leadership methods. The social psychologist and the sociologist have been mainly responsible for the advances made in developing this cooperative approach to understanding problems of managing human activity.

Situational. Attempts to appraise and improve the management of human factors in operations along the three basic lines above noted are combined by those who find it essential to regard operations as a whole. This "total" approach can be called "situational." The situational view is dynamic and regards all factors as important, whether individual, environmental, or cooperative. It admits to consideration, in understanding the functioning of a work group, any factor which may influence interpersonal relations. It is concerned with symptoms and basic causes of ineffective operations. It regards the work organization as a social system, with beliefs, symbols, habits, standards, rewards, punishments, etc. This view considers that such matters as organizational arrangements, procedures and methods, machine use, and layout all have important influence on human activity, along with such interpersonal matters as frequency and types of interactions among people. Those holding this view seek improvement of specific situations. The sociologist and the anthropologist have contributed greatly to the methodology of situational analysis. Managers and management analysts have helped to adapt these methods to workaday situations.

These four basic approaches have been used by managers and management advisers singly or in some combination to understand and improve the human relations conditions in their organizations. The Hawthorne experiments, for example, seem to have used all these approaches at one stage or another. It is perhaps too soon to single out some one viewpoint or system of appraisal as the "best." The real task is to develop fact-finding methods suitable to a

variety of conditions and in any given situation to use the one best suited.

Illustrative Guides to Managing Human Activity

IN ORGANIZING human activity, the purpose is to mobilize the resources of energy, initiative, and ideas lying latent within the people who compose the organization and to focus them on its problems and objectives. Whether the organization is successful depends in large measure on whether these potential human resources are made effective. Making human resources effective means getting people to act productively.

In the industrial and public management field we have many familiar precepts: responsibilities should be clear, reasons for changes should be thoroughly explained, misunderstandings should be cleared up promptly, jurisdictional disputes should be avoided and if they arise should be promptly settled, no favoritism should be shown, no person should be subject to the authority of more than one individual. There are many more, but these will illustrate. They are good general precepts. The manager must know, however, when and where responsibilities seem obscure to affected organization members. He may already have issued some piece of writing which he believes makes responsibilities clear cut in general. To know exactly where in his organization, as between just what two or more organization members, responsibilities are not clear, and to know how to proceed with clarifying action—these are facts of interpersonal relationships. Clarifying means securing better understanding between people. Coordination is not merely a matter of good planned structural relationships; it is chiefly the reality of effective day-to-day human activity.

What should managers do, once they understand the present relationships among the various members of the organization, to make sure that the energies of the members are expended productively both for the organization and for themselves? Of course, each organization, under the manager's leadership, must work out for itself the exact answers. That is administration, or at least a very large part of it. Yet there are some guides which have been experimen-

tally evolved, and more are emerging as the development of human relations methodology goes on. The work is gaining new impetus as many social researchers turn back to problems of industrial human relations and away from such wartime matters as military morale, "psychological warfare," evaluation of enemy morale, and the post-hostilities administration of foreign peoples.

A few illustrative guides may be mentioned. New guides and new variations of old guides are being developed constantly. Guides toward solutions are not in themselves solutions for specific problems. Considered by themselves they are potentially useful and important theory. Utilized by managers to the extent and in the particular way required by the facts of a given situation, they can become significant for managerial action.

One set of guides is to be found in the beliefs and symbols by which most of our actions are strongly conditioned, perhaps even more than by logical reasoning. Whatever the manager himself may believe about his organization, he must remember that people generally act in accordance with their own understanding about the situations that affect them. They tend to understand in terms of beliefs and symbols, and their emotions and intuitions are at least as likely to guide them as logic and reason. Most people are strongly influenced in their relations with other people, in terms, for example, of relative status. People coming from different sorts of experience tend to have different beliefs and hence different understanding of the same situation. People in different positions in an organization tend to view the same situation differently. Managers who desire to secure the coordinated action of other people will be more successful if they first secure an understanding of how the other members of the organization view the current situation.

Another illustrative underlying concept is that people's relationships with each other in operating organizations are important, and when satisfactory tend to persist. If they are unsatisfactory, people tend to try to change them, seeking more satisfactory relationships. People tend to resist changes which appear to threaten the continuation of these satisfactory relationships. Most organizations must proceed through continuous change toward their objec-

tives, else external influences tend to terminate the organization. Managers desiring to pilot their organizations through change toward objectives must understand how the internal "equilibrium" of interpersonal relationships in their organizations will be affected by proposed procedural, technological, or organizational change, and must work out some sort of compensations in order to maintain a "working balance" of satisfactory, stable, and efficient personal relationships.

Teamwork is important, too. People working together seem inevitably to form groups and build up feelings of group solidarity. It is not enough to treat people as individuals; they should also be treated as group members. The manager should understand that he is himself a group member, that his own behavior is a major factor in achieving teamwork. Realizing that groups tend to create informal relationships or structure, he can in his leadership decisions in the organization take these informal relationships into account, if he knows what they are, in such ways as to build effective team cooperation. "Real," as contrasted with "designated," leaders tend to emerge from work groups, and if the manager can get them to work toward the organization objectives, their spontaneous leadership role can be constructive.

Still another illustrative human relations guide relates to communication—not merely the issuance of memoranda by managers and their receipt by operating subordinates, but rather the achievement of effective two-way understanding. As has already been mentioned, this means chiefly understanding by organization members of the organization purposes as they are modified from day to day, and understanding by managers of the desires, complaints, and suggestions of the organization members. Two-way communication of this kind is of great value; it is most effective when it becomes habitual. Then all persons concerned tend toward free discussion of plans for the future, their problems, their uncertainties, and ideas for more effective operation. To achieve such a degree of free flow of communication, the manager must demonstrate not only that he knows it is necessary to handle complaints, to avoid favoritism, to keep confidences, to accept good suggestions, and to mod-

ify plans where necessary, but also that he can do these things well.

Another illustrative guide relates to participation by people in formulating policy that affects their own future actions. Even though it is often time consuming and sometimes seems impossible, it has been found that people usually work best when the future seems reasonably free from what might seem to them to be capricious change.

Managerial Sponsorship of Developmental Work

IF MANAGERS of public agencies wish to meet this challenge of human relations management they can score soon by giving their attention to the experimental development of the methods and skills they require. There are practically no "ivory tower" laboratories where experimentation can be conducted. The spontaneous on-the-job relationships among the people who make up operating organizations must be the basis for this work. The researcher can work only where the manager will cooperate. The manager-researcher team is essential. The cost of such experiments in any single organization is small, and since the results can often be put to immediate practical use, the experiments can pay their own way. Industrial managers are already reaping the rewards of such cooperation.

A paramount need is for a few public agency managers to take the lead by collaborating in the conduct of "demonstration" projects. Through such projects these managers can gain benefits for their own agencies and show other managers how better human relations management can be attained. Better training methods

can be developed for managers, operating deputies, administrative assistants, and other staff assistants. Provisions can be developed whereby continuous attention is given to creating better ways to assure teamwork, two-way communication, participation, etc. Experimental demonstrations are also helpful because they settle questions about utility.

Summary

1. Better management of human relations leads to greater organizational productivity and to greater satisfaction to organization members.
2. Much of the work on developing methods and skills for managing human relations is being done in private industry.
3. Public agency managers, too, can make their agencies more effective through the use of such methods and skills.
4. The methods and skills needed are simple tools of analysis and appraisal, plus reliable guides to effective action; they must be teachable to managers and their assistants of average competence.
5. Experimentation and demonstration are necessary; they must take place in actual work places, not in the laboratory. This requires collaboration between manager and human relations researcher.

Today's pressing public problems are in large measure concerned with better ways of organizing and managing human activity. Some contributions of first-rank significance are being made toward humanizing management. These methods and guides are available to public administrators who will learn how to apply them.

A Comment on "The Science of Public Administration"

By HERBERT A. SIMON

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MR. DAHL, in his incisive analysis of the problems involved in creating a science of public administration, has raised three very fundamental issues.¹ As he clearly demonstrates, "No science of public administration is possible unless: (1) the place of normative values is made clear; (2) the nature of man in the area of public administration is better understood and his conduct is more predictable; and (3) there is a body of comparative studies from which it may be possible to discover principles and generalities that transcend national boundaries and peculiar historical experiences."² While I am in fundamental agreement with all three propositions, it appears to me that there is need for some qualification and elaboration of Mr. Dahl's discussion of the first two.

The Place of Normative Values

AS THE starting point in his analysis, Mr. Dahl takes the positivist position that value propositions are not demonstrable by scientific method. He also states, albeit somewhat less clearly, a corollary that follows directly from this position: that recommendations on public policy (e.g. with respect to the delegation of legislative power or the organization of administrative adjudication) can never be purely scientific—or to put the matter in reverse, that scientific propositions alone can never lead to recommendations on public policy. It seems to me that the discussion of this

whole issue would be clarified if it were recognized that this limitation is not a characteristic of social as distinguished from natural sciences, but a characteristic of applied as distinguished from "pure" sciences.

An engineer confronted with a problem in airplane design, for example, can learn from science (if the scientific problems in this area of knowledge have been satisfactorily solved) what characteristics of speed, maneuverability, cruising range, and the like the airplane he has designed will possess. This does not solve the problem of design, however. In addition to a knowledge of the laws of aerodynamics (and the laws of physiology as applied to pilots), the engineer, in solving his design problem, must be willing to assign relative weights to these different operating characteristics—he must decide what qualities he wants in his airplane. This is not a scientific question of values. Of course, the value question can be further analyzed by asking to what purpose the airplane is to be put, and by assessing the importance of the various operating characteristics in terms of this purpose; but this still leaves the further question of *why* an airplane should be built for this purpose. No matter how far the means-end chain of reasoning is followed, there always remains at the end of it a reducible, but not extinguishable, value element.

The basic distinguishing characteristic between the pure and the applied scientist is that the former is concerned with discovering and verifying correct empirical propositions about some area of human knowledge, while the latter is concerned with reaching decisions based in part (but not exclusively) upon scientific knowledge.

¹ Robert A. Dahl, "The Science of Public Administration: Three Problems," 7 *Public Administration Review* 1-11 (Winter, 1947).

² *Ibid.*, p. 11.

The applied scientist³ does not have the same freedom as the pure scientist in restricting the particular range of phenomena with which he wishes to deal. The physicist, but not the airplane designer, may construct a theory of aerodynamics without being concerned with the physiology of pilots or the economics of fuel consumption. The applied scientist must deal with *all* phenomena that are relevant to the particular set of values involved in his problem—he must have not merely a correct system of propositions, but also a complete system.

When Mr. Dahl criticizes those administrative theorists who concern themselves solely with the criterion of efficiency, his criticism is valid and significant only to the extent that these theorists consider themselves applied rather than pure scientists. It is a perfectly legitimate undertaking in pure science to investigate the conditions under which an organization will operate more or less efficiently; it is not legitimate for an applied scientist to argue that a particular organizational form should be adopted because it is more efficient than others.⁴

As his solution to the value question in administrative science, Mr. Dahl proposes two alternatives: that we establish a basic hypothesis, or that we state ends honestly. He correctly observes that if the second alternative is adopted, the propositions of administrative science cannot be universal but will vary with the values selected. Correctly interpreted, Mr. Dahl's alternatives correspond to a pure, and an applied, science of administration, respectively.

A pure science of administration would at-

tempt to answer such questions as: "What factors determine the degree of efficiency achieved by an organization?"⁵ "Under what circumstances is public responsibility secured in a governmental agency?" The answers to these questions do not depend upon the value system of the inquirer.

An applied science of administration would attempt to use the system of empirical propositions established by the pure science to work out an implementation for any particular (complete) system of values.

Public Administration and Human Behavior

THE confusions which Mr. Dahl discusses in the first portion of his paper have troubled a large number of the workers in the field of public administration, and have led them, in the past five years, to question seriously the foundations of the accepted theory. But recent developments (we might submit the Fritz Morstein Marx textbook⁶ in evidence here) indicate that they are seeking the answer in two almost diametrically opposite directions—directions corresponding to Mr. Dahl's two alternatives discussed just above.

One group of students of public administration is saying: "Let us become, frankly, applied scientists. If we are to do this, we must concern ourselves with values, and we must broaden our interests so as to encompass *all* the values involved in any important question of administrative organization. Since efficiency is only one of these, we cannot be concerned solely with efficiency. We must range over the whole field of public policy."

By this path public administration rejects its obsession with a limited range of values, re-establishes its right to consider the application to problems of public policy of its knowledge—and loses its identity as a separate field of political, or even of social, science. For if public administration is to be an applied science it cannot recognize boundaries that were established for purposes of academic specialization

³ We might avoid some semantic confusion by calling him a "designer," since his work is not scientific insofar as it involves the analysis, selection, and weighing of values, but we shall retain the less radical term.

⁴ It might be argued, parenthetically, that part of Mr. Dahl's attack on the efficiency criterion as a proper value criterion in the applied science of administration can be repelled by a sufficiently broad definition of efficiency which avoids the means-end terminology and its accompanying problems. In other words, in developing an applied science of administration we may either admit values other than the efficiency criterion; or we may broaden the efficiency criterion to encompass at least some of these other values. This point, which is developed in the present writer's forthcoming book, *Administrative Behavior*, raises issues beyond the scope of this note.

⁵ When the question is stated this way it can be seen that a pure science of administration does not involve any such "worship of efficiency" as Mr. Dahl charges (*ibid.*, p. 2).

⁶ *Elements of Public Administration* (Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1946), 637 pp.

and that limit the system of values with which it may concern itself. It cannot ignore the theory of sovereignty, or of representation, merely because these are not traditionally considered questions of public administration, any more than the airplane designer can ignore the physiology of the pilot simply because this is not traditionally a question of aerodynamics.

But this applied science of public administration cannot stop when it has swallowed up the whole of political science; it must attempt to absorb economics and sociology, as well. These implications are already clearly evident in the interchange between Hayek and Finer, in the analyses of Wootton, in the second half of Leighton's *The Governing of Men*, and were earlier foreshadowed by the first two essays in Merriam's *The Role of Politics in Social Change*.

To trace out these implications is not to criticize the development that is taking place. It is clear, however, that there cannot be an applied science of public administration any more than there can be an applied science of aerodynamics.⁷ The real goal of this particular group of revolutionaries would be much clearer if they described themselves (as some of them already do) as being concerned with the field of "public policy," or, better yet, if they revived the older, and very respectable, terms "political economy" and "social economy." The term "social engineering," while it clearly underlines the applied character of the endeavor, carries too strongly the taint of a mechanistic approach.

Leaving the applied social scientists, who have found the field of public administration too narrow for their interests and their needs, we find a second group of rebels, a group of which I count myself a member, who wish to

create a pure science of human behavior in organizations—and, in particular, governmental organizations—who are dissatisfied with the traditional, formalistic, and legalistic administrative theory, and who propose to raise a more solid theory on the foundations of social psychology. This group does not, or should not, have any illusion that it is prescribing for public policy. So far as the practical value of its work is concerned, this lies only in the use that its propositions may find, in conjunction with those of a number of other pure social sciences, in the hands of those whom I have chosen to call "political economists."

If my analysis is correct, there does not appear to be any reason why these two developments in the field of public administration should not go on side by side, for they in no way conflict or contradict. But the workers in this field must keep clearly in mind in which area, at any given time, they propose to work. Moreover, this bifurcation of the field of public administration, and the uniting of the segments with the applied and pure aspects, respectively, of the other social sciences, will highlight in the boldest type the existing inadequacies of present-day training for research in public administration. For him who proposes to do work in the applied area, it will condemn a narrow specialization in any one area of political science, or even in the whole of it, in favor of both a broad and a deep training in political science, economics, and sociology—a return to the original meaning of political economy. For the man who wishes to explore the pure science of administration, it will dictate at least a thorough grounding in social psychology.

We cannot accept Mr. Dahl's reassuring answer that it is unnecessary for the student of public administration to become a psychologist and that merely he "must be capable of using the investigations of the psychiatrist and sociologist." The notion of bringing several specialties to bear upon a single problem by giving several specialists desks in the same office, or membership on the same committee, and asking them to "cooperate" may be a feasible method of dealing with certain problems of applied science (although even there it has not been more than moderately successful). It certainly is not an effective method of carrying on

⁷ Unless, of course, we are prepared to accept Mr. Dahl's rather startling first delimitation of public administration (*op. cit.*, pp. 2-3): "The basic problems of public administration as a discipline and as a potential science are much wider than the problems of mere administration. The necessarily wider preoccupation of a study of public administration, as contrasted with private administration, inevitably enmeshes the problems of public administration in the toils of ethical considerations." This definition of scope certainly corresponds to what we have been describing as the applied science, and with equal certainty does not correspond with Mr. Dahl's later definition of the pure science (*op. cit.*, p. 4) as concerned with "human behavior in the area of services performed by governmental agencies."

original research at the frontiers of pure science. The only really satisfactory synthesis of specialties takes place within the intricate mechanism of the individual human brain.

Public administration, in its "pure" aspects, cannot be conceived as a purely passive field that accepts the conclusions of psychiatrists and sociologists as to the "nature of human nature" and then applies these conclusions to the area of organization behavior. Administration is itself an important area of human and social behavior, and research in administration is research in psychology and sociology, quite as capable of contributing as it is of accepting

new knowledge in these fields. The research worker in administration must consider himself not merely a person whose work *is related to* social psychology, but a person who *is* a social psychologist concentrating in a particular special area of human behavior. His training must be guided accordingly.

In a comparable fashion, the political scientist, the economist, or the sociologist who wishes to do first-rate work in the area I have designated as "political economy" must be more than an intelligent amateur (another name for it is dilettante) in the fields of social science that lie outside his particular specialty.

The Twain Do Meet

By JOHN R. CAMPBELL, JR.

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ON THE morning Judge Byrnes called for the elimination of large conferences involving travel, I met a vice president of a national organization on the 8:18. In discussing the travel edict, he said, "Wonderful, isn't it? Because of the war, we don't have conferences. We don't expatiate on our policies. Our men in the field are in comparative ignorance as to our latest and most up-to-date thinking. And yet we do more business!"

This cogent remark made me stop and wonder about the value of our regional conferences. In attempting to appraise these conferences, I thought first of their origin and then of their subsequent development.

In 1936, the Social Security Board established some sixty field offices throughout the United States under the immediate supervision of twelve regional offices. The managers of the offices, recruited from various endeavors, had new and common problems to face, such as that great unknown, "public relations," office management under government auspices, and uniform interpretation of ambiguous rulings. The individuals in charge in the various regions, in many instances having just come from private business and having a high degree of initiative, attempted to resolve many of these problems by summoning managers to a central point in the region for discussion. In time, as the organization grew, and as individual field experiments began to be adopted as national policies, the central office recognized these regional conferences as media by which the pulse of the field could be taken.

Where do we now stand in the conduct of these regional conferences, with 470 field offices in twelve regions and an average conference attendance of from sixty to seventy people? Constantly we must strive to preserve informal discourse and spontaneity as against the pro-

found inertia bred by excessive planning and attention to mechanical detail. It is not possible to fill "each unforgiving minute" with ninety seconds worth of distance run.

It is true that "every working conference should have clearcut and concisely stated objectives." The real objective of any conference reaches far deeper than an outline of the subjects to be discussed and the location of ash trays. Regional conferences such as ours, and probably those conducted by any large national organization, can do little to strengthen technical proficiency. Their major value lies in creating a common high spiritual denominator throughout the organization. In brief, I would suggest that the fundamental purpose of a regional, divisional, or similar type of conference in a national organization is the establishment of national unity.

Although business can be more precisely transacted through the written than the spoken word, national interpretations follow in the train of the written word. These interpretations frequently impair that harmony of personal relationships so essential in the forward progress of any organization. The decider in the central office avoids multiple decisions by establishing zones of uniformity. This uniformity is often distressing to the person who must apply it regardless of conditions. Personal harmony thus disrupted can be restored only by "visiting." The twain not only do meet, but must meet to restore harmony.

The first step in the conduct of a conference must be a definition of purposes. The first purpose is national unity. In order to overcome misunderstanding and achieve national unity, conferences are planned on a positive tone. Fault-finding is conspicuously absent. Granted that improvement is the goal of any conference, it can usually be attained better by recognition

of present accomplishment than by denying or belittling it. Managers may come to these conferences feeling that individual or group delinquencies will not be brought up at this time but at a more suitable time and in a more suitable way. The four freedoms are practiced and encouraged: freedom of speech; freedom to worship whom one will; freedom from fear; and freedom from want.

How may closer and better official and personal relationships be secured? Generally, this objective has been approached in one of two ways. The first is a lecture or statement by the central office representative followed by open discussion. There is one serious drawback to this approach—the central office representative first presents his views, and this action has the effect of bringing about silence which can frequently be misconstrued as acquiescence. It has been well said, "Long speeches set the stage for group passivity." The majority of people are unwilling to oppose their views to those expressed by constituted authority for fear of jeopardizing personal progress. Again, if the group is large only the more self-assured participants give voice to their opinions and take the lead in discussion. As a result, over a period of time, it can be predicted in advance who will speak and in many instances what attitude they will take.

The second method, the panel discussion, faces much the same handicaps. To be successful, the panel must be composed of those individuals who would have taken the lead from the floor. The chief result, therefore, is to transfer the burden of discussion from the floor to the platform.

The practice adopted by several organizations of running two or three panels concurrently has offered some remedy for these difficulties. Breaking the large group down into smaller units in some measure overcomes the natural hesitancy of some people to give voice to their views. In order to stimulate interest, new subjects are introduced. Attendance at discussion groups is made optional. Physical arrangement and facilities are very important. Preferably panel members should sit at a round table and the audience in chairs spaced at some distance from the panel so that individual members of the audience may leave without disturbing others or feeling conspicuous.

The third general method, probably by far the most successful, has been the holding of "rump" sessions. During these evening meetings, the central office officials have come to know a number of managers well. There has been a friendly interplay of views and opinions on a give-and-take basis. The drawback to this device is the limited number attending. Recently a concerted effort was made to secure wide participation in these rump sessions by setting up a number, and unofficially nominating their leaders. The various members visited from room to room with the result that practically all participated in the informal chats.

Debate has proved to be a successful method. It elicits greater freedom of expression than any other method thus far tried. Participants are assigned their subject and the side they shall take; each feels quite free to make his points regardless of whether he believes they might be in conflict with previously expressed management policies.

Finally, our most generally practiced method is to assign subjects to managers and request them to write papers. This method has the advantage of giving every one a place in the agenda, but after a period of years there is likely to develop a dearth of consequential subjects.

The second major purpose of our conferences might be best described as regional unity. Under this purpose there are various aims to attain, probably the first of which would be morale. I was much impressed recently by a quotation from the admiral in command of the "Rodney" during the invasion of Normandy. He stated that Germany had lost the war because the men of the German Navy had lost the will to fight.

I suppose the most important factor in morale is belief in leadership followed by belief in one's self. The following story was told at one of our regional conferences. When Joe McCarthy, the manager of the Yankees, was asked how he turned out so many championship teams, he replied that he told each new team that this was the best he had ever managed. Further, he said that there was a good reason for its being the best team—it had the advantage of improvements in the techniques of baseball that his previous champions had not had.

Results demonstrated the effectiveness of McCarthy's method.

It has been pointed out that we try to make our national managers players in these conferences. This method carries in its train a number of advantages for the visitors from the central office. With eleven regional conferences each year, in which in general the same five or six central office officials participate, it does not take long for each individual's "master speech" to become boring to the troupe. This lack of spontaneous interest soon becomes apparent to the managers and is likely to impair the desired effect. By making conferences truly "regional" and placing responsibility for preparation of the agenda in the regional offices, interest in doing an outstanding job is stimulated. It may be that several of the points that the central office considers major are omitted from the agenda. On the other hand, we have found that usually these points are brought up from the floor during a discussion period, at which time the central office official is requested to express his point of view. Because the information is then given as the result of a request, attention is keener and more sustained; group morale is raised because the group feels that it was the first to see this important point.

We also attempt to achieve regional unity by encouraging exchange of ideas among managers. Some may feel that this is most effectively accomplished from the floor, but this method is open to challenge. Often there is resentment of the individual who stands up and asserts or implies that the method he has devised or developed is the best. The same individual disclosing his secret under different "environmental characteristics" usually has a ready and receptive audience. One of the reasons is that the idea may already have been developed by one or more of the listeners; when two people find that they have been thinking of the same idea, the sympathetic warmth of a new bond is engendered.

It is always our hope that the exchange of ideas which takes place at a regional conference will result in the carrying back of new ideas to the individual offices. We hope ultimately to reach the receptionists and clerks who meet the public. If the value of the conference stops at the managerial level, the expense is high and the results low. As soon as a

conference is over we attempt to have a summary issued sufficient to awaken memories of highlights and key points, so that managers returning to their offices may meet with their staffs and review the results and the desired objectives.

Perhaps the third objective of our regional conferences is the appraisal of personnel. One of our major duties in the Social Security program is to inform the public. The effectiveness with which information is presented will in a large measure determine how it is received. Regional conferences offer a modified proving ground for appraising the skill of personnel in this respect. The regional conference also provides opportunities to size up managers as to leadership, poise, alertness, and, in some degree, soundness of thinking.

The fourth purpose of our regional conferences is to provide a sounding board on policy. They furnish an excellent forum for learning of criticisms of recently inaugurated policies. Such policies might be concerned with personnel, technical phases of the program, or administrative operations. The primary aim of the discussion should be to demonstrate that there are two sides to every question, that neither is absolute, and that the course chosen represents some compromise. Almost invariably, my experience has been that the discussion tends toward an attempt to establish a black or white solution, rather than to define a shade of gray.

Regional meetings may also be helpful in bringing out necessary variations in the application of a national policy owing to local conditions. The administrator always tries to limit the number of decisions he may be called upon to make; the easiest way to bring this about is to establish a policy. Unfortunately, in a country as large and varied as the United States, establishment of a policy frequently increases rather than decreases the number of decisions, since policy is frequently unworkable on a national scale. Much emphasis has been placed on the effects of environment on office work loads. Environment affects the application of all national policies, and a regional conference is a good place to discuss variations. Regional conferences should constantly impress on those responsible for national administration the necessity of flexibility in the local applications of

any policy, making it clear that means should never obscure results.

Another objective in our regional conferences is the discussion of proposed plans. At this point I would warn that in a conference as well as in administration planning may be overdone. I believe Cooper, in his book on conferences, said that "the price of excessive analysis is often the paralysis of initiative." This is something that must be closely watched in the preparation of conferences and in the discussion of proposed plans. Although interesting, the devotion of a large amount of time

to guessing what may happen and, if it does happen, what interpretation may be put on it, and if the preceding two guesses are correct (which they never are) what will be the probable result, borders on the unprofitable.

The foregoing paragraphs generally describe the objectives and methods of our regional conferences. We have tried to give these conferences their proper place in our administrative organization. They cost money, and we have endeavored to ensure that the money is spent on purposes which will yield satisfactory dividends.

Reviews of Books and Documents

The Professors and the Practitioners

By William A. Jump, U. S. Department of Agriculture

ELEMENTS OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, edited by FRITZ MORSTEIN MARX. Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1946. Pp. vii, 637. \$6.65.

I

ELEMENTS OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION is among the first of what we may justifiably hope will be a number of "extra dividends" the American people will receive during the next decade arising out of the active employment in the federal government during the war period and several preceding years of an unprecedented number of professors and other authorities in the fields of political science and public administration. Each of the fourteen authors of this book has a distinguished academic and professional background in political science and public administration. Their faculty and other institutional identifications comprise a good cross section of the resources of the United States for higher learning in political science and public administration. Except for a common interest in the study and improvement of the processes of government, their personal backgrounds are as varied as their institutional relationships.

The purpose of the authors, fully borne out by the text, is well stated in the preface:

The principal aim of the book is to deepen the reader's understanding of the administrative process as an integral phase of contemporary civilization. In a sense, therefore, this is a broadly political rather than merely technical study. Its focus is on the fundamental problems of public administration—the problems that assert themselves at countless points within the framework of governmental effort. The analysis here presented attempts to explore both the range of controlling institutional factors and the variables of administrative behavior.

The evils that spring to one's mind at the mention of fourteen authors of one book are effectively eliminated, while the advantages arising out of this circumstance are fully achieved through an unusual demonstration of teamwork. Again quoting from the preface:

The fourteen men who came together to form the team discovered that they thought very much alike about the field of interest they had in common. When they joined forces, all of them were engaged in the practical business of public administration; all of them were under the influence of fresh experience; and all of them were stimulated by new insights that open up to those placed strategically within the administrative structure.

These exceptional circumstances held forth the promise of a unified and systematic treatment of the subject rather than a symposium made up of unconnected essays. In the exchange of views among the members of the team, the preliminary plan grew into an integrated enterprise to which each member contributed his carefully defined share. Throughout the writing of the book, its character as a combined operation was sustained by the team spirit of each participant.

It is indeed fortunate that so many experts in the history and theory of government could have been brought together during a considerable period in which they were all actively engaged in helping to solve the day-to-day problems of public administration during one of the most significant periods in the history of the federal government. When it is remembered that this group constitutes but a fraction of the total group from the political science and public administration faculties of the American universities who have rendered such service during the past fifteen or so years, it is difficult to overestimate the significance of this circumstance in relation to the present and fu-

ture teaching and research in the field of government in every part of the United States. Among the many by-products also is a certain, even if unmeasurable, benefit to many of the regular practitioners who have been brought into personal contact—some for the first time—with persons in whom the faculty for probing, examining, thinking, and writing about government as government is developed to a degree not likely to be found in the mass of regular practitioners.

Elements of Public Administration will quickly become a must item for teachers, researchers, and students of public administration. It will find its way into the working libraries of the more thoughtful practitioners. It also could be read with great profit by many among the great body of American citizens who find themselves coming into direct contact with public agencies. If such books were read by the general citizen it would help him to understand much about his government that now baffles and more than occasionally irritates him.

II

AS THE literature in the field of public administration becomes richer and immeasurably more useful, the problem of how to assure that it comes to the attention of and is used by the great mass of practitioners is increasingly important. The mass of practitioners occupying more or less key spots in governmental organizations are not generally aware of the existence of a body of useful literature in the field of public administration. Since they are not aware of its existence, it also escapes their notice that this literature is by leaps and bounds becoming more usable from their point of view. An acquaintance with this literature would give them a better understanding of the setting in which they labor. It would assist them in the solution of their problems. It would provide them with a clearer idea of the background of American government and the implications of this background with respect to administration; as a result their own immediate tasks would be facilitated and the public would be served better.

Elements of Public Administration, for example, has nourishment of high vitamin content for the public servant who feels frustrated

by the multiplication of problems in the area that we designate "administration." I do not mean to give the impression that the book offers technical findings or procedural panaceas for the ailing administrator. The very fact that it does not is one of the reasons it is a good book for administrators to read. What it does do is to impart to the reasonable reader a new conviction, or a reaffirmation of faith, that there is a vital, identifiable zone of responsibility and function that goes by the name of "administration." It sets out the specific elements that comprise the principal content of this field and shows how they relate to the public welfare in the broadest and most comprehensive sense. It describes how administrative functions came to be what they are today, how much depends upon their being carried on effectively, and some of the factors and conditions that determine whether or not they are.

In an organization as complex as modern government, administrators are worn by the burden of delay, irritation, and strain caused by the processes, procedures, reviews, controls, and other paraphernalia and gadgets that add up to the superficial, and perhaps conventional, concept of administration. I am not stating whether all of this paraphernalia is necessary or not; that is another story. It exists in fact and the individual administrator has to live with it. To the discouraged practitioner who may have lost faith that public administration is a fundamental or dynamic field of human activity, the following paragraphs are heartening and will guide his jaded senses back to a fresh start or a renewed quest for the real thread of basic values which we know lies imbedded in the meshes of procedure and the jungles of operational underbrush we so loosely call public administration:

Administration as Part of All Planned Effort. Save for those who drift through life and care not where the current takes them, all men know something from their own experience about the importance and the ways of administering their affairs. For to refuse to let circumstances run some wayward course and to work instead within the limits they impose to attain a more acceptable end—this, at heart, is the idea of administration.

In simplest terms, administration is determined action taken in pursuit of conscious purpose. It is the systematic ordering of affairs and the calculated

use of resources, aimed at making those things happen which we want to happen and simultaneously preventing developments that fail to square with our intentions. It is the marshaling of available labor and materials in order to gain that which is desired at the lowest cost in energy, time, and money. No man, therefore, who singly or in company with others has ever laid out—or had laid out for him—a course of action and proceeded on it can be without some intimation of the nature of administration. Motivated by their desires and interests, individuals and groups of individuals set themselves their main goals; what they do thereafter to translate these goals into positive achievement is essentially administration.

Regardless of the field of human endeavor, there is thus an administrative side to all planned effort. In simple situations where the things that need to be done are obvious, and it is fairly plain who can best do what, it is possible for people sharing an objective to work as a team and never grow aware of the fact that their teamwork for the common purpose spells administration. But when conditions become complex or difficult, when it is no longer easy to know how to proceed or whether the resources available will be adequate for gaining the common end, the administrative aspect emerges as a matter of special attention.

This conscious concern with administration arises first, and principally, among the comparative few to whom it falls to outline programs, devise procedures, and direct or supervise operations. In a more general way, the importance of administration also comes to be recognized by the many—those through whom the process of cooperative effort operates, so to speak—and how they “see” it will usually make a considerable difference in the success or failure of the enterprise. Where they share in its purpose and can look forward to sharing in some way in its fruits, administration is accepted as the means whereby they are enabled to be successful in their jobs, and they work accordingly. Where they reject the purpose and see no prospect of a fair participation in its results, administration is regarded as a means of exploiting them against their will—and under such circumstances even a genius in management will be unable to achieve more than poor results (pp. 3-4).

The fact that the practitioner does not derive as much help as he might from the literature in the field is not a condition for which he deserves criticism. It arises out of several circumstances. To begin with, the government employee usually becomes a practitioner of public administration after he has been trained

and employed as a chemist, a forester, an economist, a statistician, a physicist, an entomologist, an agronomist, an accountant, a stenographer, an auditor, a lawyer, a physician, or in any one of the hundreds of occupations and professions now utilized by public agencies. During all of his public service, even though he may move into an assignment where administration becomes of major importance, he is likely to continue to function in his original and what he considers his basic setting. He knows he is a government employee. Indeed, he is deeply conscious of that fact and it makes a significant impress on his whole occupational outlook. But often he does not see himself, consciously and purposefully, as one who is *engaged in public administration*. This kind of concept is largely confined to those who enter the public service after a formal education in which they major in political science or public administration, plus the relatively few who acquire this sensitivity as they go along, by reason of the special paths their official work may take, unusual contacts or associations, or some sixth sense which leads them into the conscious realization that they are practitioners of the art and science of public administration.

There are other reasons for this lack of self-identification. Not the least among them is that, contrary to the popular public belief, the practitioner is a very busy person, often driven almost to distraction by the time and other pressures of his immediate job. The fact that so many of his difficulties lie in the zone of what he is likely to call “administration” gives hope that now is the time when he will be more receptive than ever before to anything that will help him. Since he is generally an intelligent being, I believe he will welcome the information that there is a literature available to him, in increasing volume and with a content that will be useful to him. The problem is how to convey this information to him.

Many practitioners are skeptical as to the usefulness of books on public administration. It has been my custom for a number of years to warn my associates among the practitioners, or to argue with them, as the case might require, that the professors are very penetrating observers—the most objective and useful reporters and analysts of the governmental process. Certainly, it will not be news that practitioners in

general are hard to convince of this, nor is it strange that so many practitioners in public administration incline to mistrust any voice except the voice of experience. The idea has many merits and it is indulged in by many groups besides public administrators. Fortunately, it does not seem to impede unduly the objective study of public administration by the professors. It does, however, block off the great body of practitioners from the understanding and help they could receive from the growing body of useful literature in the field.

If the practitioners in medicine, law, agriculture, or architecture, for example, were as generally unaware of the resources in the literature in their fields, we would all be quite upset. This unawareness or disinterestedness is not altogether the fault of the government practitioner. In addition to the lack of homogeneity in his employment group, to which reference has already been made, is the fact that there has not been in the past too much literature that he could reasonably be sure would help him. Still another is that somehow there has been a failure to devise a really effective instrumentality of informing him of what has come out that he will probably want to read. In recent years, however, the literature shows a great improvement from the standpoint of utility. Also in recent years various professional societies, organizations, and journals have been established that are directed in part to the interests of the practitioner. These are encouraging developments. But bear in mind that only the surface has been scratched.

I still recall the surprise I experienced some twenty years ago when I began to make the acquaintance of the professional public administrators and of the literature they were producing. I discovered that they knew a great deal indeed about what actually went on in government, why it went on, and what it meant; also, why some things worked well and some did not, and how the result might have been different had different assumptions or alternatives been considered. I did not then, and do not now, think they are always right about everything, nor have I ever felt under any intellectual or other pressure to agree with all of their thinking. But I gained a great, and I believe a healthy, respect, which continues to grow, for the penetrating insight, the compre-

hensive knowledge of government in all of its aspects, the diagnostic ability, the sheer power of competent mental analysis, and the repertorial skill that many teachers and researchers in political science and public administration are bringing to bear on the problems of government and the improvement of its processes. How to bring about closer contact between the products of such stimulating minds and the urgent, even if often unrealized needs of the practitioners of government is an important problem that we must not neglect.

III

ELEMENTS OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION will be of great value to teachers and students of public administration. It should be useful as a textbook. Not only will the authors who have gone back to teaching do a much more realistic job, by reason of their experience and observation, but the material they have produced will make it possible for teachers and students everywhere to share in these benefits. Practitioners frequently observe, whether correctly or not, that graduates who enter the public service reflect an overexposure to the more theoretical or stratospheric aspects of public administration. Another complaint, in the opposite direction, is that, in the effort to escape that kind of overexposure and meet the supposed public service demand for people with "practical" training, some graduates show an overdose of the procedural aspects of administration, amounting in some instances to a dogmatic fixation on points that have to be unlearned or dislodged because they are inapplicable to the job in which the graduate finds himself.

It is hard indeed to please everyone. In general, however, it is easier to produce a satisfactory practitioner from the graduate who has acquired an education along broad lines and who is well grounded in the fundamentals of public administration, including a familiarity with the various aspects of the administrative process, than from the graduate who is overdosed with procedures. This approach to education for public service was well stated by Robert A. Walker in the October, 1945, issue of the *American Political Science Review* in an article titled "The Universities and the Public Service." *Elements of Public Administration* is

a book that will help to implement this approach.

Elements does not ignore the realities of public administration; on the contrary, it is highly realistic. But it travels by airplane over the procedural marshes that may so easily impair the teaching of those preparing students for the public service. It recognizes the existence and the importance of these marshes, but refuses to get bogged down in them. This is a good sign. It seems to recognize as an educational objective something that Paul Appleby and I used to agree upon about once a month when he was in the Department of Agriculture in the 1930's and we were trying constantly to find people who could do a good job in difficult spots—namely, that our greatest need in public administration was for people who had an interest in and were capable of grasping the economic, social, policy, and other broad implications of public programs and who *at the same time* were willing and able to master some of the precise details of administration without which not much could be accomplished. It was possible to find so-called "policy people." It was possible to find so-called "administrative people." But to find people who combined the two types of qualifications was another matter. They were then, and they are now, rarely in evidence.

As a result, "policy" tends to be dealt with by people who are not always as realistic as the public service requires and "administration" tends to fall into the hands of the procedure addicts who insist that while man may not be able to live by bread alone he certainly can thrive on a diet of procedure. Of course, teachers of public administration are not entirely to blame for the scarcity of persons with properly balanced qualifications, but certainly it must be true that they can do a lot to improve the situation. The philosophy and content of *Elements of Public Administration* strike a balance that should make it a helpful vehicle in stimulating this approach in teaching and in learning.

IV

THE active public service of the fourteen authors of *Elements of Public Administration* covers a wide range of federal activities. They served in key administrative, program, or military spots during the war, and some of them

were in government service for some time before the war. This experience, however, suffered certain limitations. Where program work was involved, they served with the so-called "alphabetical agencies." Where over-all staff work was involved, they served primarily in the U. S. Bureau of the Budget, eight of the fourteen having been employed by that bureau. Their experience therefore reflects a certain lack of representative sampling of government.

There is a marked tendency on the part of professors of political science and public administration to observe the processes of government from the vantage point of central budget and similar over-all staff agencies at the federal, state, and local levels. There is nothing wrong about that. Quite the contrary, these general staff organizations are a place where teachers of government can profitably spend a considerable period of time. So far as the inner workings of the federal government are concerned, the Budget Bureau is the "crossroads of the world." The Bureau must deal with practically every matter of importance in the federal government in some form and frequently at several stages. This tends to be the emerging pattern in other jurisdictions. It is natural for the professors to be drawn to such agencies, as by a magnet. They find it stimulating to observe government at the point of centrifugal force. Also, they make a real contribution by tours of duty in budget and other general management agencies. They have been of tremendous aid in developing and in encouraging the acceptance of better and more adequate concepts of the mission of budget and personnel agencies in modern government, concepts that were long overdue. Also, it is fortunate and a mark of credit that budget and other general management agencies have utilized the technical services and intellectual resources of the professors in substantial number.

It is regrettable that more of the program, or operating, agencies have not more frequently had the benefit of similar services. The fault here, if there be one, is not to be laid at the door of the professors. For a variety of reasons, and despite certain exceptions, program agencies have not generally known just how to utilize their services. New agencies have been more inclined to use such services than so-called "old-line" agencies. However, if there were a

better distribution of professorial tours of duty between the upper reaches and higher distillations of government and the sea levels of the ordinary operating agencies where the programs of government are actually carried into effect, the observations and points of view of the professors would be based upon a more representative sampling of government than can possibly arise out of the concentration of focus upon the central staff agencies.

In spite of this reservation, the fourteen authors of *Elements of Public Administration* certainly were where "things were happening."

Upon the foundation of their already rich knowledge of the field they have been able to build a highly stimulating and altogether useful structure of contemporary thought based upon personal experience and first-hand observation of government in motion. It is most fortunate that already they are giving American public administration the tangible benefits of this coming together of theory and practice. It would have been so easy for them to have kept on reflecting about their experiences for a few more years, notwithstanding the fact that their observations are sorely needed now.

Training of Continental Jurists for Public Administration

By Henry S. Bloch, United Nations

LAW TRAINING IN CONTINENTAL EUROPE; ITS PRINCIPLES AND PUBLIC FUNCTION, by ERIC F. SCHWEINBURG. Russell Sage Foundation, 1945. Pp. 129. \$1.00.

I

THERE is much pertinent information and a good deal of wisdom in this little book. The law training systems considered are those of Austria (thirty-six pages), France (ten pages), Germany (eighteen pages), and the Soviet Union (fourteen pages), the space devoted to each system probably having been allocated on the basis of the familiarity of the author with the various law training programs. Unfortunately, an analysis of the important developments since 1940 has been omitted and the entire study has a definitely pre-World War II character. However, the report is still useful, particularly since it is not an apologia but a critical, competent appraisal. Although the author is a former continental lawyer, his study is not a sentimental journey into his past.

The introduction and the concluding chapters deal with the educational aims and the social role of jurists. It is considerations of this nature rather than the detailed descriptions of the courses and examinations which the reader may find interesting.

The educational aims on one hand and the

training processes on the other, the nonprofessional course of the law school and the strictly professional clinical character of the apprenticeship period, are described as a "two-pronged approach." A broad educational background provided in high school serves to develop the analytical faculties of the jurist; these are later applied to political, economic, administrative, and social aspects of public and private life. The social position of the continental lawyer is in part explained by the nature of his training which destines him to serve as a member of an elite. Readers must not generalize too broadly from old Austria's class-ridden society, for the Soviet Union and even France are in entirely different categories. Nevertheless, certain features are common to all continental law schools; one of these is the extensive government control over all phases of legal education and practice. The importance of legal training for government work varies more from country to country than the author implies.

According to Schweinburg the advantages of continental law training are to be found in the nature of pre-university training, the nonprofessional character of university education, the extensive treatment of public law and certain aspects of the social sciences, and apprenticeship training. European secondary schools—and this is true for all countries under consid-

eration with the exception of Nazi Germany—equip the prospective law student with a general education and ability for systematic analytical thinking. In the university he acquires a comprehensive, conceptual view of the law and a considerable historical background. The public law training, in particular, makes European jurists more "administration minded" than their American colleagues.

The main negative element of continental law training according to Schweinburg's analysis is that continental legal positivism does not foster in the student an ability or a desire to inquire into the causes of economic and social ills. Consequently, it does not stimulate him to work toward the improvement of economic, social, or moral standards of groups or of society as a whole. Indeed, there is little in the training and educational program prompting students to strive for reform of the legal structure.

When analyzing the Soviet system, the author has the advantage of not being loaded with the heavy baggage of detailed information which he has on Austria and Germany. He devotes the few pages on the Soviet Union to generally relevant observations, stressing the political features of the educational process and emphasizing the role of competitive examinations, the absence of a legal monopoly of administrative services, and the lack of an unemployment problem for jurists.

In the German and Austrian chapters the role of the newer economic and political science departments is described, and in the French chapter an attempt is made to describe the functions of the *École des Sciences Politiques*. The essential weakness of the German chapter is the lack of a political analysis of the legal travesty under the Nazis. There is no reference to the more delicate features of the relationship between the infra-structure of the Weimar system and the supra-structure of the Nazi system¹ and no real explanation of the low public morals of German jurists.

In spite of certain shortcomings, Schweinburg's slender volume deserves a place on the reference shelf of the student of comparative

law who is interested in central European law and training up to the time of World War II.

II

THE following observations by the reviewer do not necessarily conflict with Schweinburg's analysis and may serve to bring out a few salient features of the changing role of jurists in postwar Europe, especially in the Western European countries.

As Schweinburg implies, continental European law training does not focus on service at the bar as its exclusive or even its main purpose. It is at least as much directed toward the preparation for service on the bench in government departments and agencies and in politics. In most continental countries the majority of lawyers have a period of practical training as public servants in government, either in administration or the judicial services.

In the United States, lawyers appear in government service and politics in large numbers but relatively few law schools give primary attention to specialized preparation for such careers. Whatever training and education for the bench is given must be calculated toward a delayed action effect because American judges usually start their careers only after long periods in private practice as civil servants, teachers, or in some instances as prosecutors.

Continental law schools place primary emphasis on education *in the law* while most American schools underline the importance of training for *law as a profession*. The gap in the *training* of European lawyers is supposed to be filled in the years of practical apprenticeship while the gap in the *education* of American lawyers is supposed to be filled in the years of college education preceding law school. However, the modern trend in European law is to bolster the *training features* in the university curriculum while the trend in the prominent American law schools is to improve the *education features*.

The work in European high schools, too, is undergoing a change. For some time the preponderant role of the humanities has been challenged by the natural sciences. Social sciences are hardly taught in continental high schools with the exception of the Soviet Union where education in social problems starts very early and plays a significant role. In France, the

¹ See Ernst Fraenkel, *The Dual State: A Contribution to the Theory of Dictatorship* (Oxford University Press, 1941), 248 pp.

new concept of the "école unique" broadens the access to universities to lower social strata and to remote rural areas and may give more prominence to the social sciences. American high schools, weak as they are in humanities, give at least some foundation in the social sciences, which is then reinforced by the college program.

European jurists must rely entirely on the university curriculum for education in the social sciences. There is much talk about the background in economics of the continental lawyer and even Schweinburg gives the impression that continental European jurists are almost professional economists. The truth is that in central and western Europe jurists are subjected to a good deal of systematic education in economic institutions, history, and doctrines but only seldom do they study economic theory and problems in the modern Anglo-Saxon sense. It is nevertheless true that most of the continental economists come from law schools and in France, for instance, law and economics are taught in the same department.²

The minimum standards of continental universities (possibly excluding the Balkans) are higher than the minimum standards of American universities. European universities are mostly state controlled, relatively few in number, and rigorously supervised. Each country sets uniform minimum standards. One should not conclude, however, that American top standards do not equal or even exceed maximum achievements in European universities. Of course, generalizations of this kind are always to be taken with a grain of salt. Schweinburg makes the important remark that European law schools grew inside universities while American law schools grew outside the university. While it appears that the law training as such offers a greater variety of courses in Europe, the contiguous facilities in social sciences, of which the jurist can avail himself if he wishes, are infinitely richer in the large American universities.

According to Schweinburg, the legal diploma was in many countries the only key that

opened the door to most branches of the public service or, if not that, it was the magic wand which provided advancement over non-legally trained competitors. This, coupled with the fact that the study of law was costly and that part-time or evening study was extremely difficult owing to the organizational pattern of the schools, molded some European jurists into a caste. In central Europe, jurists were the pillars of the bureaucracies, and the bureaucracies, together with the Army, big business, and sometimes the church, were the pillars of the state. In capitalist countries, most of the jurists were sons of the bourgeoisie; almost all of them believed themselves to be of the elite. They hardly noticed how their increasing numbers decreased their chances, their social standing, and their political role. Members of the unsuccessful majority identified themselves with a successful minority of brother jurists and ambition was hardly dampened by the fact that although the majority of the bureaucratic and political elite were jurists, the majority of the legal profession would never have a chance of becoming members of this elite.

The decline of the role of the jurists was brought about partly by an increase in their numbers and partly by the advent of the social sciences. The law degree continued to be a great asset; coupled with an economic or sociological background it became a very powerful element. Administration as a technique continues to be important and the daily techniques of obtaining consent and approval require a legal mind. As the state branched out into new fields of economic and social relations, administration became a social science. Technicians were no longer sufficient; strategists were needed.³ Complicated international negotiations affected a wide variety of subjects and, again, knowledge of social problems was required in a sense wider than man-made rules and regulations. In some fields, such as administration of state economic enterprises, it was the technician in economics and industry who menaced the position of the jurist. In other fields, such as international relations, the law-

² For a discussion of the integration of the curriculum see Gaëtan Piron, "L'Enseignement économique en France," in *L'Enseignement économique en France et à l'étranger* (Librairie du Recueil Sirey, 1937), pp. 1-21.

³ An excellent analysis of the policy role of administrative officials is to be found in David M. Levitan, "The Responsibility of Administrative Officials in a Democratic Society," 61 *Political Science Quarterly* 562-598 (1946).

yer sank to the position of technical adviser if he did not lift himself beyond the limitations of his profession.

The power of any degree is diminished where a competitive examination is the entrance key to public service. In France the law degree does not confer a monopoly in bureaucratic careers, since for these competitive examinations historical or sociological diplomas are often recognized as having the same value as law degrees. About one hundred years ago (Decree of March 9, 1848) a school for public administration was proposed and even led a semiofficial existence for a year or two. In 1871 the *École Libre des Sciences Politiques* was established and since that time a type of administrator who is part jurist and part social scientist has been developed to serve in the inspection of finances, diplomacy, and some other "corps d'élites." This type of broadly educated administrator, usually belonging to the upper classes, often conservatively minded, entered the "corps d'élite" as a junior officer. Knowing less about legal codes and textbooks but more about world politics, finance, and economic institutions than regular jurists, he was superior to the mere lawyer. He was a type who was supposed to use legal advice and to weigh its significance, to coordinate technical assistance, and to develop structural rather than technical plans.

As the Fourth Republic is expanding its activities, members of this bureaucratic elite still play an important role as directors, yet in certain quarters there is suspicion of this managerial class. Projects to eliminate or diminish this leadership have thus far failed; currently emphasis has been placed upon a change in

recruitment. In a public document, *La Réforme de la Fonction Publique*,⁴ the principles of reform are laid down. There is no room in this essay to elaborate on them. The gist of the new training program is to maintain the broad approach of the *École des Science Politiques*; to eliminate the class character of its student body by liberal scholarship grants; to streamline its teaching in the social sciences; to decentralize political science training by placing institutions outside of Paris; and to integrate the teaching of political science with other teaching regarding state institutions. It is significant that the intellectual and political godfather of the project is a left-wing ex-professor of public administration, Deputy Pierre Cot. It is also significant that many of the old professors of the *École des Science Politiques* teach in the new programs. The administrative reform has not yet affected the upper levels of French administration but it has begun to show some impact on recruitment policy.

I implied that the jurists have already yielded to the social scientists some of their powers as administrative advisers, but that the jurist-social scientist combination is still very much in vogue. At present, of course, all professionals in Europe benefit from the great scarcity of trained personnel, but these lines may become obsolete as the new scientific developments make so many social changes subject to basic technological revolution. The new leadership may include men broadly versed in physical and social sciences who consider law as a subdivision of the social sciences—the social engineers in the true sense.

⁴ Imprimerie Nationale, 1945.

News of the Society

President White has initiated a series of occasional letters to presidents of chapters of the Society to keep chapters informed of current developments.

The first two letters mentioned action taken at the annual meeting of the Society in March (reported to the general membership in the Spring issue of the *Review*) and told of the organization of chapters on college and university campuses at the University of Chicago, University of Michigan, Syracuse University, Princeton University, and Roosevelt College.

President White talked before the Washington, D. C., and the Kentucky Chapters in May. During an extended west coast trip he scheduled calls at several centers where chapters have been established or are contemplated. Later, on an eastern trip his itinerary included other chapter areas.

Each year the Department of Government, Pomona College, awards the Russell M. Story Prize to the student doing the best work in the course in public administration or in state and local government. This prize includes membership for one year in the American Society for Public Administration.

CHAPTER NEWS

Alabama

The Alabama Chapter held a business meeting in Montgomery on April 23 and elected new officers as follows:

President—Charles W. Terry, state director of personnel

Vice President—Hallie Farmer, professor of government and history, Alabama College

Directors—Loula Dunn, state commissioner of public welfare

John Graves, comptroller, State Department of Finance

Edwina Mitchell, member of State Board of Pardons and Paroles

Alex S. Pow, director of Legislative Reference Service

The new officers appointed Roscoe C. Martin, bureau of public administration, University of Alabama, secretary-treasurer.

Following the business meeting, members and guests held a dinner program meeting, attended by about sixty persons. Since the new Governor has proposed a considerable spending program, the panel discussion was on the subject, "Where's the Money Coming From?" Panel members were Senator Bruce Henderson, chairman of the Legislative Interim Committee on Finance and Taxation, Paul E. Alyea, professor of public finance, University of Alabama, and Peter B. Hamilton, director of the corporate and franchise tax division, State Department of Revenue.

California—Sacramento

The Sacramento Chapter held a reorganization meeting May 7 attended by some twenty-six persons. The constitution was amended to increase the number of elected directors from three to five or more and the following officers were elected.

President—Charles W. Johnson, deputy attorney-general, State Department of Justice

Vice President—William K. Smith, state training officer, State Personnel Board

Secretary-Treasurer—Perry L. Stauffer, staff, Legislative Budget Committee

Directors—Frank B. Durkee, attorney for the State Department of Public Welfare

Clarence Malm, principal accountant, State Department of Finance

John F. Fisher, executive officer, State Personnel Board

Richard A. McGee, director, State Department of Corrections

William H. Mitchel, administrative analyst, U. S. Bureau of Reclamation

Carl Richey, assistant to the general manager, Sacramento Municipal Utility District

California—Southern California

The annual meeting of the Southern California Chapter was held June 11 following a dinner at the Rosslyn Hotel. The program was a panel discussion of "Principles of Organization," with Fowler Jones, assistant director of the Los Angeles Bureau of Budget and Efficiency, as chairman.

Officers to serve for 1947-48 were elected as follows:

President—Peter Keplinger

Vice President—John Vieg, Pomona College

Directors—Will Baughman, California Taxpayers Association

Garrett Breckenridge, Los Angeles County Bureau of Administrative Research

Winston W. Crouch, University of California at Los Angeles

Judith Jamison, Bureau of Governmental Research, University of California at Los Angeles

John M. Pfiffner, University of Southern California

John Steven, Los Angeles City Schools Personnel Commission

George Terhune, Los Angeles Bureau of Budget and Efficiency

Connecticut

The Connecticut Chapter held a dinner program meeting at Hotel Garde on April 15 at which Harold Lasswell, professor of law, Yale University, and director of war communications research, Library of Congress, was the principal speaker. The subject of this meeting was "Human Relations in Public Administration."

District of Columbia

The Washington, D. C. Chapter met April 9 with council member Wayne Coy as the after-dinner speaker. Mr. Coy, assistant to the publisher of *The Washington Post*, recently returned from a trip to Japan, Korea, and the

Philippines, spoke on "Military Government in the Far East."

The annual meeting was held May 14 with the president of the national Society, Leonard D. White, professor of public administration, University of Chicago, as speaker.

Chapter officers for the 1947-48 season were elected as follows:

President—G. Lyle Belsley, assistant general manager, Atomic Energy Commission

First Vice President—Manlio DeAngelis, chief, program planning staff, U. S. Civil Service Commission

Second Vice President—Dorothy Schafter, research counsel, Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress

Executive Committee—Senior members

Elmer B. Staats, U. S. Bureau of the Budget

Donovan Q. Zook, U. S. War Department

Junior members

Sylvia Barger, Federal Public Housing Authority

John Pryor Furman, U. S. State Department

Illinois—University of Chicago

On April 17 a meeting was held on the campus of the University of Chicago for the purpose of organizing a chapter. Attendance at this first meeting was about sixty. A constitution was drafted and adopted, officers elected, and about forty new members enrolled. The chapter plans to hold monthly meetings. The officers elected by this first campus chapter are:

President—Marvin W. Heath

Vice President—Richard W. Gable

Secretary-Treasurer—Wilma H. Bangert

The second meeting of the University of Chicago Chapter was held May 23. Don K. Price, associate director, Public Administration Clearing House, talked on "The Executive Office of the President."

Kentucky

The Kentucky Chapter met April 8 in Lexington for a dinner meeting. The principal part of the program was a discussion of "The Management Job of Direction" including such

phases as understanding the goal, the role of praise and reproof, oral and written direction, use of manuals, developing loyalty, use of conferences, coordination, and use of personal review of work in administrative activities. Panel members were Aaron Paul, division of public assistance; Ervin Rothenbuhler, U. S. Public Health Service; J. E. Luckett, former commissioner of revenue; and James Mott, formerly of city manager's office of Coral Gables.

The May 20 meeting of the Chapter was held in Louisville. Leonard D. White, the national president of the Society and professor of public administration, University of Chicago, addressed between fifty and sixty members and guests assembled from Lexington, Frankfort, and Louisville on "The Federal Dilemma."

Massachusetts

The Massachusetts Chapter met May 15 at the Faculty Club, Harvard Business School to hear a talk on "International Control of Atomic Energy." The speaker, Lincoln Gordon, associate professor of business administration, Harvard Graduate School of Business, member of the Editorial Board of *Public Administration Review*, is also consultant to the U. S. representative on the U. N. Atomic Energy Commission.

Michigan

The University of Michigan Chapter, the second campus chapter to be organized, adopted its constitution April 25. Graduate students in political science who were elected to office were:

- President*—G. Homer Skarin
- Vice President*—I. Harding Hughes
- Secretary*—Elizabeth Myerson
- Treasurer*—Alberta Brown

New Jersey

The Princeton University Chapter was formed May 16. President of the Society, Leonard D. White, visited Princeton and met with the organizing committee briefly preceding the formal adoption of the chapter constitution.

The Chairman of the Chapter is Joseph E. McLean, lecturer at Princeton University. The Secretary-Treasurer is Harry Ransom, president of the Politics Club at Princeton University.

New York—Capital District

The Capital District Chapter met April 10 in Hearing Room No. 2 of the State Office Building in Albany for a panel discussion on "Public Administration and Public Relations." Consideration was given to the contribution of the specialist and the responsibility of the administrator and the technician in relation to the better understanding of government. Moderator of the session was Frank J. Corr, Jr., Department of Audit and Control. Participants included Herman C. Beyle, Syracuse University; Morgan Strong, State Conference of Mayors; and Herbert Campbell, State Department of Commerce.

The Capital District Chapter held its final meeting of the program year May 22 with a dinner at the Wellington Hotel in Albany. Paul H. Appleby, dean of the Maxwell School of Citizenship, Syracuse University, was the principal speaker.

Officers to serve for 1947-48 season were elected as follows:

- President*—Byron T. Hipple (re-elected)
- Vice President*—Murray Nathan, New York State Department of Health
- Directors*—John Daniels, Jr., New York State Division of the Budget
- Philip E. Hagerty, New York State Salary Standardization Division
- Charles F. Gosnell, New York State Library
- M. P. Catherwood, New York State Department of Commerce

Milton Musicus, New York State Salary Standardization Division, was re-appointed secretary-treasurer.

New York—Metropolitan Area

The New York Metropolitan Chapter met April 29 for dinner in the Faculty Dining Room of Hunter College. The subject for discussion was "The Use of District Offices in Municipal Administration."

This was the first of the new type of program. Each speaker reported something about the number and types of district offices used by the department he represented, the responsibilities assigned, relations between headquarters and

the district office, and the general attitude of the department toward the use of district offices. At this particular meeting, officials from three city departments told of their experiences in using district offices: August P. Flath, Police Department; Charles J. Labdon, Department of Sanitation; V. Charlotte Authier, Department of Public Welfare.

On May 28, the discussion was on "Organization of a Municipal Department," using as an example the Department of Public Works of the city of New York, its organizational plan and relationships. Albert H. Morgan, director of the division of operations of the department, was principal speaker.

New York—Syracuse

The Syracuse University Chapter constitution was adopted May 9. The chapter has about forty members drawn from the faculty and from the graduate and the undergraduate schools.

President—William Childress

Vice President—Jo Desha Lucas

Secretary-Treasurer—Olga Lewis

Council Members—Clifford R. Gross

Kearney Jones

Earle Stanley Legg

Spencer D. Parratt, faculty representative

Oregon

The Oregon Chapter met June 18 for dinner at the Portland Chamber of Commerce to discuss "Congressional Reorganization." Joseph P. Harris, professor of political science, University of California, led the discussion.

Pennsylvania—Philadelphia Regional Chapter

On March 17 members of the Society living in the Philadelphia region were consulted on the matter of chapter formation and a committee, composed of the following, was invited to confer:

William C. Beyer, University of Pennsylvania

James C. Charlesworth, University of Pennsylvania

Lemuel A. Geyer, Immigration and Naturalization Service

Charles R. Messick, New Jersey Civil Service Commission

Bennett F. Schaffler, National Labor Relations Board

Raymond S. Short, Department of Political Science, Temple University

Stephen B. Sweeney, University of Pennsylvania

Alvin C. Watson, U. S. Soil Conservation Service

At a meeting May 7 the committee decided that a chapter should be organized in the area; that the programs should be conducted in seminar style with presentations on related subjects carefully prepared by competent leaders; and that they should constitute a chain of developed material relating to the day-by-day work of the members.

The first meeting was scheduled for dinner, June 5, in the Benjamin Franklin Room, Houston Hall, University of Pennsylvania. Following dinner there was a discussion on "Reconciling the Practice and Theory of Service Ratings in a Government Agency." Robert P. Wray, deputy secretary of the Pennsylvania Department of Public Assistance, led the discussion.

Washington

In Seattle an organizing committee was set up in June. Committee members are:

Stanley J. Erickson, Civil Aeronautics Administration

Warner Shippee, Federal Public Housing Authority

Don C. Sampson, Bureau of Public Administration, University of Washington

Henry Thomson, Quartermaster Corps, War Department

Ira Edwards, War Assets Administration

Harold A. Lang, Washington State Personnel Board

Charles T. Oliver, Seattle Employees Retirement Association

George A. Shipman, department of political science, University of Washington

Irving D. Smith, Veterans Administration

